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The field-programmable gate array (FPGA) technology is becoming increasingly 
common in the instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants 
(NPPs). The technology is now being adopted even in the most safety-critical 
systems. An FPGA is a digital semiconductor device that can be used as a 
replacement for the current microprocessor-based software systems with which there 
are problems e.g. in safety justification. An FPGA application has practically the 
same capabilities as a software application but is less complex and thus arguably 
easier to qualify. However, the FPGA is still rather new in the nuclear power industry 
and thus there are no consistent and harmonised international guidance and standards 
regarding how to design and license FPGAs for NPP safety automation applications.  
 
In this thesis, a general overview of the FPGA technology is first given. The 
activities in the different phases of the FPGA design and verification and validation 
(V&V) processes are defined based on processes found in various different sources 
with the intent to identify best practices for said processes. After the general 
overview, the current applications, advantages and disadvantages, and other aspects 
related to FPGAs in NPP safety automation are looked into. A comparison with 
microprocessor-based systems is also done in order to recognise the perceived 
benefits of using FPGAs instead of microprocessors. Finally, a case study is 
presented. In the case study, a fictional but realistic safety automation application is 
implemented using two FPGA devices. The objectives of the case study are to try out 
the different design and V&V methods found in the literature, and to get hands-on 
experience on the FPGA application development and V&V. 
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Kenttäohjelmoitava porttimatriisi (FPGA) -tekniikasta on tulossa yhä yleisempi 
ydinvoimaloiden instrumentointi- ja säätöjärjestelmissä. Nykyään FPGA-tekniikkaa 
on alettu käyttää jo kaikkein kriittisimmissäkin turvajärjestelmissä. FPGA on 
digitaalinen puolijohdetekniikkaan perustuva mikropiiri, jota voi käyttää esimerkiksi 
korvaamaan mikroprosessoripohjaisia ohjelmistoteknisiä järjestelmiä, joiden kanssa 
on tällä hetkellä ongelmia muun muassa turvallisuuden ja toimivuuden 
osoittamisessa. FPGA-sovelluksella pystytään lähes kaikkeen samaan kuin 
ohjelmistosovelluksella, mutta se on yksinkertaisempi ja täten väitetysti helpompi 
kelpoistaa eli osoittaa sen toimivuus. FPGA-tekniikalle ei kuitenkaan ole vielä 
ydinvoima-alalla kansainvälisesti hyväksyttyjä ja yhdenmukaisia ohjeistuksia ja 
standardeja, jotka ottaisivat kantaa siihen, mitä kaikkea FPGA-pohjaisten sovellusten 
kelpoistaminen ja lisensiointi vaatii. 
 
Tässä diplomityössä esitellään ensin FPGA-tekniikka yleisesti. Esittelyssä käydään 
muun muassa läpi eri lähteistä yhdistetyt FPGA-sovellusten suunnittelu- ja V&V 
prosessit. Eräs työn tavoitteista on löytää näihin prosesseihin liittyvät parhaat 
toimintatavat. Yleisesittelyn jälkeen käydään läpi nykyiset sovellukset, hyödyt ja 
haitat, sekä muut FPGA-tekniikan käyttöön ydinvoimaloiden turva-automaatiossa 
liittyvät asiat. Samassa yhteydessä tehdään vertailu FPGA- ja mikroprosessori-
tekniikan välillä, jotta voitaisiin tunnustaa FPGA:n edut mikroprosessoriin 
verrattuna. Lopuksi diplomityössä esitellään case-tutkimus, jossa toteutetaan yksi 
kuvitteellinen mutta realistinen turva-automaatiojärjestelmä käyttäen kahta FPGA-
laitetta. Case-tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on kokeilla eri suunnittelu- ja V&V-
menetelmiä, jotka löydettiin kirjallisuudesta, ja saada käytännön kokemusta FPGA-
sovellusten suunnittelusta ja V&V:stä. 
Avainsanat: FPGA, ydinvoima, automaatio, turvallisuus, suunnittelu, verifiointi, 
validointi 
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1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter is organised in four brief sections. First, the background for 
the work done in for thesis is explained in Section 1.1. Then, the current situation of the 
field-programmable gate array (FPGA) technology in nuclear power plant (NPP) safety 
automation is shortly described in Section 1.2. After that, the objectives of this work are 
recited in Section 1.3, and finally the organisation of the rest of the chapters of the 
thesis is elaborated in Section 1.4. 
1.1 Background 
This work has been done at VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland as part of the 
“Coverage and Rationality of the Software I&C Safety Assurance” (CORSICA) -project 
of the Finnish Research Programme on Nuclear Power Plant Safety 2011-2014 
(SAFIR2014, 2013). One of the tasks in the CORSICA project is looking into new 
technologies that could be used as the implementation technology of the digital NPP 
instrumentation and control (I&C) systems such as safety automation. Among these 
technologies is the FPGA. 
The NPP-related research of FPGAs was started at VTT in 2011. In early 2012, the 
first publication regarding the subject was published (Ranta, 2012). Later that year, a 
case study was conducted where a fictional but realistic safety function called the 
Stepwise Shutdown System (SWS) was implemented using FPGA technology 
(Lötjönen, 2012). Now as part of this work, the SWS case study is expanded by 
designing and implementing a more complex system using two different FPGA devices. 
In the new case study, more emphasis is put on the verification and validation (V&V) of 
the design. 
The FPGA technology is rather new in the nuclear power industry, and therefore the 
FPGA-specific guidance and regulations have not yet matured. There are 
inconsistencies between the guidance and regulatory views of different organisations 
and regulators on how to design and qualify FPGA-based systems for NPPs. The 
interest toward the use of the FPGA technology in NPP safety automation applications 
is rising world-wide, and thus there is a need to harmonise the international regulations 
and guidance so that they can be correctly understood by the power utilities and system 
vendors. The work done for this thesis can be seen as part of the international 
harmonisation. 
1.2 State-of-the-art 
International research regarding the use of the FPGA technology in NPP safety I&C 
systems is on-going by many organisations. There are a lot of actual projects where the 
FPGA is used as e.g. a replacement for old systems in NPP modernisation projects, and 
also as an integral part of new I&C platforms in new NPPs. Because there are no 
internationally harmonised guidance and regulations regarding the design and V&V 
methodologies of FPGAs in NPPs, different standards and guidance are used in many 
projects where NPP safety automation is implemented using the FPGA technology. It is 
not yet known, what kinds of evidence should be required regarding the correctness of 
the applications. 
The well-defined software-related standards most commonly used in the design and 
V&V of software-based applications are not by themselves adequate for use with 
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FPGAs because the design of FPGA applications also requires the hardware aspects to 
be taken into account. The need to address the hardware-related issues makes the design 
process more complex as the designer needs to have knowledge of both the software 
and the hardware aspects of the FPGA design. 
In 2012, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) published the 
standard 62566 (IEC, 2012) specifically regarding the development of FPGA-type 
devices for category A functions in NPPs. However, the guidance in the standard is seen 
as insufficient because its contents are not as comprehensive as was initially expected. 
In many places, there are merely references to other e.g. software-related standards. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also shown interest in the 
technology by joining the sponsorship of a dedicated “Topical Group on FPGA 
Applications in NPPs” that has held annual meetings five times by 2013 (IAEA, 2013). 
The meetings are organised as workshops where representatives from regulators, power 
utilities, system developers and vendors, and research organizations gather to discuss 
the current tides regarding the subject. As part of this work, the fifth workshop held in 
2012 in Beijing, China was attended. Related to these workshops, the IAEA is currently 
working on a publication regarding the applications of FPGA technology in NPPs and it 
is due to be published in 2014 (IAEA, 2013). 
Even though the FPGA is rather new in the nuclear power industry, it is as such a 
mature technology and has been extensively used in other safety- and mission-critical 
applications such as aviation and space flight. Therefore, the standards and guidance 
describing the methods and activities in the design and V&V processes from the other 
fields may prove to be useful when developing applications for FPGA-based NPP safety 
automation applications as well. 
1.3 Objectives 
One of the main objectives of this work is to try to identify the best practices for the 
design and V&V methods used in the development of FPGA-based systems for NPP 
safety automation. This is important because the technology is new in the field and the 
international standards and guidance are not yet consistent and mature. In this work, the 
perceived best practices are first collected from various sources in literature and then 
combined together to form consistent design and V&V processes. As it is still not clear 
what V&V methods are sufficient to provide enough evidence of the correctness of the 
applications, it is also interesting to assess whether using these methods provides 
sufficient evidence or are additional methods still required. 
Another objective is to assess the advantages and disadvantages of using FPGA 
technology in NPP safety automation and whether it actually provides added value 
compared to using e.g. software-based systems. In many sources in literature, 
experience of actual NPP safety automation applications implemented using the FPGA 
technology is reported which may be helpful when assessing the suitability of the 
technology for these applications. 
With the help of a case study, the identified design and V&V methods are tested to 
see whether they are easily applicable to actual systems, and also to get hands-on 
experience of the challenges and limitations related to them and to the overall design 
and V&V processes. To get a realistic impression it is not enough to merely read about 
the methods, and therefore actual FPGA devices are used. Experience gained from 
studies such as this one, where the methods are applied to actual designs, may be 
valuable for the on-going harmonisation of the international standards and guidance.  
The scope of the case study is reduced to merely trying out the different design and 
V&V methods instead of aiming to produce comprehensive evidence of the correctness 
3 
 
of the system in the case study. Another objective of the development of the case study 
is to generally build up VTT’s competence for assessing FPGA-based NPP safety 
automation applications. It is possible that VTT will be asked to assess such 
applications as they may be considered for the Finnish NPPs in the future. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
After this introductory chapter, the FPGA technology is described in Chapter 2. The 
description includes a general overview of the technology, a look at the hardware 
aspects, and detailed explanations of the identified design and V&V processes for 
developing and testing FPGA-based applications. 
Different aspects related to the use of the FPGA technology in NPP safety 
automation are then looked into in Chapter 3. The chapter includes a short description 
of the main characteristics and general principles of NPP safety automation applications 
after which some of the difficulties regarding conventional software-based systems are 
listed to justify the search for new technologies such as the FPGA. 
Following this in Chapter 3, there is an explanation of how the FPGA technology 
can be used in NPP safety automation applications and what are the main advantages 
and disadvantages. The FPGA is compared to microprocessors and then some examples 
of actual FPGA-based systems are given at the end of the chapter.  
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the case study where a fictional but realistic safety 
automation application was implemented on two FPGA devices. In the chapter, the 
design and V&V processes that were followed through in the case study are described 
with a lot of illustrations of the design products along the way. 
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2 Field-Programmable Gate Array Technology 
This chapter describes the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) technology in 
general. The purpose of this chapter is to provide general knowledge of the technology 
without any special emphasis on the nuclear power industry. The NPP applications of 
the FPGA technology are looked into in Chapter 3. 
This chapter is organised in four sections. An overview of the FPGA technology is 
given in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 describes the hardware aspects of the technology. In 
Section 2.3, the different phases of application development process for FPGAs are 
described. Section 2.4 elaborates methods to verify and validate FPGA applications and 
design phase products. 
2.1 Overview 
Field-programmable gate array technology (FPGA) was invented in 1984 by a company 
called Xilinx (Maxfield, 2004). An FPGA is an integrated circuit (IC) device and is 
sometimes classified as a programmable logic device (PLD), a complex programmable 
logic device (CPLD), or a complex electronic component (CEC). The classification 
varies between different organisations, and this sometimes causes confusion especially 
in the nuclear power industry, where the technology itself is still rather new (Arndt et 
al., 2012). Essentially, an FPGA is a digital programmable IC that contains thousands or 
millions of logic gates and interconnections that can be configured to implement desired 
functionality. The two biggest FPGA manufacturers are Altera and Xilinx, but there are 
some smaller manufacturers as well, such as Microsemi (formerly Actel). 
FPGA evolved from a technology called Application Specific Integrated Circuit 
(ASIC). ASICs are functionally quite similar to FPGAs: they contain logic gates that are 
configured to implement functionality. However, the term “field-programmable” in 
FPGA refers to the feature of FPGAs that they are programmed by the customer rather 
than by the FPGA manufacturer. The programming of ASICs is done by the 
manufacturer during the manufacturing process. This makes ASIC technology ideal for 
mass produced products, where identical devices are used for example in millions of 
similar applications. However, the development of ASICs is costly because a special 
cast needs to be made in order to manufacture them. One of the early applications of 
FPGAs was prototyping ASIC designs (Maxfield, 2004). 
In the beginning of 1990s, FPGAs were mostly used in telecommunication and 
networking applications. They were ideal for high speed processing of big chunks of 
data that is typical of those applications. By the end of the 1990s, the rapidly evolving 
FPGA technology had spread to multiple fields such as automotive industry, consumer 
electronics, aviation, some industrial applications, and even space applications. 
(Maxfield, 2004) 
FPGAs are manufactured blank i.e. the transistors are not configured in any 
particular way. This enables a low price and a great flexibility in their use. FPGA 
manufacturers provide software tools that are used to create applications for the devices. 
Many FPGAs are also re-programmable, which enables an iterative design process, 
where a designer can test designs on actual hardware and then make modifications to 
them later on. This also makes an FPGA application updatable, which is beneficial for 
preventing obsolescence after years of operation (Arndt et al., 2012). 
FPGA is said to be “hardware designed like software”, meaning that the design 
process resembles software development in many ways but the end product is more like 
a hardware application (Ranta, 2012). FPGA devices can implement very complex 
functionality like software, but can still offer the reliability of a hardware application. 
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FPGAs do not require an operating system or task switching, and are therefore 
considered less complex than software applications (EPRI, 2009). However, as the 
FPGA design process is similar to software development, it is also susceptible to similar 
errors. 
Although much of the FPGA application development is similar to software 
development, it requires additional steps where the hardware aspects are taken into 
consideration. A designer must be familiar with hardware related issues such as 
input/output pin voltages and assignments, signal propagation delays and timings, clock 
frequencies, and device resources. When developing applications for traditional 
microcontroller-based systems, the designer typically does not need to take into account 
what type of a central processing unit (CPU) is used or to which pins of the CPU 
various devices are connected. A high level programming language, an automatic 
compiler, and the operating system can take care of these aspects. 
2.2 Hardware 
This section covers the hardware-related aspects of FPGAs. First, the internal structure 
and the main components of an FPGA device are elaborated. After that, the different 
memory technologies that are used to store and maintain the configuration of the 
FPGAs are described. The operational principle of an FPGA is then described after 
which some types of failures that may occur with FPGAs are described. 
An FPGA device is typically a black rectangular device a couple of centimetres in 
diameter whose bottom is covered with pins that connect it to a circuit board. Inside the 
device, the actual FPGA core chip is connected to a pin package. On the chip there are 
four kinds of major components: input/output (I/O) blocks, configurable logic blocks 
(CLBs), wirings, and switch boxes. A simplified illustration of the internal structure of 
an FPGA device is in Fig. 1. 
 
Figure 1: Simplified illustration of the internal structure of an FPGA device 
The CLBs comprise of the basic semiconductor components called ‘system gates’ on 
the chip. The overall amount of system gates varies from thousands to millions. 
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Different manufacturers name and implement the I/O blocks and CLBs differently but 
the functions are essentially the same between manufacturers (Smith, 2010). For 
example, Actel calls them VersaTiles (Microsemi, 2012a), and Altera calls them logic 
elements (LEs) (Altera 2006). 
The I/O blocks handle the communication between the FPGA and other devices 
through the pins of the FPGA device. The I/O blocks typically contain registers, buffers, 
pull-up resistors, voltage translators, and other components that are assisting 
communication (Smith, 2010). The I/O blocks also transform data into suitable formats 
to make it be usable inside or outside the FPGA (EPRI, 2009). 
The CLBs are the lowest abstraction level components that the designer can observe 
and manually affect during the design process. They consist of smaller components such 
as lookup tables, flip-flops, registers, adders, multiplexers, etc., which in turn are 
constructed using the basic system gates. Using these basic features, the CLBs can be 
configured to perform various tasks. Additionally, An FPGA may contain predefined 
non-configurable blocks e.g. for implementing memory. 
The capacity of an FPGA is measured in the amount of CLBs rather than system 
gates. This means that even though one FPGA has more system gates than another 
FPGA, it can still have a smaller capacity if it has fewer CLBs than the other FPGA. In 
this case, the other manufacturer has used fewer system gates to implement the CLBs. 
The switchboxes can be implemented using different memory technologies. As the 
wirings in Fig. 1 enable the communication between the CLBs and I/O blocks, the 
switch boxes determine how the wirings are configured. In the figure, only some wires 
are drawn but actually there are wires between all the elements with only some being 
used. The switch boxes are memory elements that can be implemented using three 
different technologies: static random access memory (SRAM), flash, and antifuse 
(Ranta, 2012). Each of these has advantages and disadvantages over each other. 
SRAM is the most common memory technology found in FPGAs (Maxfield, 2004). 
It consists of six complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) transistors and 
implements a functionality of a flip-flop that can be used as a register element (Ranta, 
2012). Although six transistors are needed, the SRAM-based memory elements are 
physically smaller due to the more advanced CMOS technology. This makes it possible 
to pack vast amounts of transistors in a smaller space than for example with flash-based 
memory elements. 
Being at the forefront of the IC industry, CMOS is more advanced and further 
developed than the other technologies. One big advantage of SRAM-based FPGAs is 
that all the other components on the FPGA are also CMOS-based. Therefore SRAM-
based FPGAs do not require special manufacturing processes that are needed when 
combining different technologies (Maxfield, 2004). 
SRAM is a re-programmable memory technology that is also volatile, which means 
that it retains its configuration only as long as the power is enabled i.e. a certain voltage 
is present (Ranta, 2012). SRAM-based FPGAs are used for example in high-
performance applications such as network routers, and since they are easily re-
programmed, they are ideal for developing and testing new designs on actual devices. 
Due to their volatility, SRAM-based FPGAs need to be configured each time they are 
powered up, which requires them to have an external non-volatile memory where the 
configuration is stored and from which it can be read. SRAM is more susceptible to 
disturbances caused by for example radiation than other memory technologies (Ranta, 
2012). 
Flash is based on a technology called electronically erasable programmable read-only 
memory (EEPROM) and, like SRAM, it is re-programmable. Unlike SRAM, flash is 
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non-volatile, which means that a voltage is not needed to maintain the configuration. 
Although only one flash transistor is needed to implement a memory element, the 
technology is less mature than in SRAM-based FPGAs. Due to the less advanced 
technology, flash-based FPGAs have typically smaller capacity than SRAM-based 
FPGAs. Flash-based FPGAs are used in low-power applications such as mobile devices. 
As they have a better resistance to disturbances than SRAM-based FPGAs, they can be 
used in more harsh environments such as aerospace (Ranta, 2012). 
Antifuse is the simplest and most reliable of the three technologies. Its name derives 
from “fuse” that refers to a device that is used to cut power if too large a current flows 
through it. Antifuse acts the opposite way: initially it does not let current through but 
when a large enough current is introduced, a path for the current is “burned” through the 
antifuse element. Antifuse is immune to most disturbances because its configuration is 
mechanical and irreversible (NRC, 2010a). For the same reason, the information 
security of an antifuse-based FPGA is the best. Antifuse-based FPGAs are suited for 
high-reliability applications such as safety-critical systems and spaceflight (Ranta, 
2012). 
When an FPGA operates, signals propagate via the wirings and switchboxes 
through the configurable logic blocks (CLBs) that operate according to their 
configuration. An FPGA does not execute instructions or lines of code like a 
microprocessor. Instead, the static configuration that does not change during operation 
determines the functionality. FPGAs operate truly parallel, since each CLB performs its 
functions independently of others and using its own resources. 
For example, consider a two-input logical AND-block. Its inputs could be assigned 
to some pins that are connected to for example two hardware switches. Similarly, its 
output could be connected to a pin that is connected to a light emitting diode (LED) that 
indicates the result of the AND operation. If the switches are turned on indicating 
“TRUE”, signals would propagate via the wirings and switchboxes to the CLB or CLBs 
that implement the AND-block. The CLBs would then execute the AND-functionality 
and, as a result, would send a “TRUE” signal via the wirings and switchboxes to the pin 
that the LED is connected to. 
As another example, consider the AND-block from the previous example. This 
time, five instances of the gate are implemented in an FPGA. The I/O-ports of each 
instance would be connected to different pins connected to different switches and LEDs. 
Now, additional resources, i.e. CLBs, I/O blocks, and wirings are required to implement 
the additional gates. The function is similar to the case where there was only one AND-
block: when a switch is turned, the corresponding wire conveys the signal to the 
corresponding CLB(s) where the signal is processed and the corresponding result is 
assigned to the wire that is connected to the corresponding LED. Each instance is 
implemented in separate hardware and separate wirings which enables a truly parallel 
execution. Each AND-block is oblivious of the others. 
There are a few kinds of faults that can occur when using an FPGA. Detailed causes 
and effects of different faults are described in (Ranta, 2012). Some cause permanent 
damage and some may only be temporary but can still affect the operation in a possibly 
disastrous way. Some permanent faults are the result of aging and degrading due to long 
operation times and/or a harsh operating environment. Faults introduced in 
manufacturing and during application design are also considered permanent faults, 
although design faults in re-programmable FPGAs can be corrected through re-
configuration. 
Transient faults are faults that do not cause permanent damage but may cause failures in 
the operation. Common sources of transient failures are single event effects (SEEs), 
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which can be caused by power fluctuation or radiation. SEEs may alter the 
configuration or the states of registers of the CLBs of the FPGA. SEEs may also cause 
permanent damage to the chip if severe enough. 
The faults due to aging and the operating environment introduced over time are 
mostly related to the physical properties of the FPGA device. More details about the 
physical aspects of different faults are given in (Ranta, 2012).  
2.3 Design 
Developing applications for FPGAs is similar to developing software. Typically, the 
development involves designing and writing code that is similar to normal software 
source code. However, an FPGA designer must also consider hardware-related issues 
which in software development are taken care of by the compiler and the operating 
system. Toward the end of the design process, the phases resemble those found in 
integrated circuit (IC) design rather than software development (Wikipedia, 2013) 
The FPGA design process is described in various sources, and most of them contain 
the same basic phases. Some go into more detail and divide some phases into multiple 
parts. In this section, a general overview of the FPGA design process, inspired by 
various models from several sources (NRC, 2010a; Smith, 2010; Gaisler, 2002; EPRI, 
2009), is elaborated phase by phase. In Fig. 2, the design process is illustrated along 
with the corresponding V&V phases and output documents.  
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Figure 2: Combined design and V&V processes with the types of output products of 
each phase 
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The design and V&V processes in Fig. 2 represent the author’s subjective view of the 
most suitable flow of the phases although they bear many similarities to those presented 
in the NUREG/CR-7006 of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, 
2010a). However, the phases are named differently from the NUREG/CR-7006, and 
each phase has a corresponding V&V phase. The names of the design phases in the 
‘Design’ column in Fig. 2 seem to be more common than those in the NUREG/CR-7006 
in other sources. 
The V&V phases in the NUREG/CR-7006 only contain individual activities such as 
reviews and simulation. In the ‘V&V’ column of Fig. 2, the phases are more 
ambiguously named because each phase may contain several activities and not merely 
simulations or reviews. The V&V activities related to different phases are elaborated in 
Section 2.4. 
The ‘Output’ column in Fig. 2 contains the types of products that are the outputs of 
each design phase. The purpose of the output boxes is to give an idea what type of 
outputs are generated in each design phase, so there may be additional documents to 
those listed in the figure. 
 
Requirements specification 
 
The requirements specification starts the design process. The purpose of the 
requirements specification is to completely and correctly specify all the features that a 
system is required to have so it fulfils its intended purpose and function. Sometimes 
requirements specification is not considered to be part of the actual design but instead 
an independent document that the following design documents are based on and 
compared to. 
The requirements may be based on a concept of the system, or they can be imposed 
by regulations and legislation. This is especially characteristic of the nuclear power 
industry. The requirements may derive from higher level instrumentation and control 
(I&C) system architecture requirements. The requirements are usually specified in a 
requirements specification document which is a textual document written in natural 
language. Also graphical requirements specifications exist. They may impose 
requirements regarding a certain type of architecture for example. 
The requirements can be roughly divided into functional and non-functional 
requirements. Functional requirements describe the required behaviour of the system, 
and non-functional requirements describe requirements related to e.g. the response 
times, performance, operating environment, interface, hardware characteristics, 
radiation tolerance, etc. The requirements are typically described as individual clauses. 
Some characteristics that a good requirement should have are (SAREMAN, 2012, 
Tommila, 2012): 
 
• Correctness: requirements corresponds to the needs of the stakeholders and the 
purpose of the system 
• Feasibility: requirement can be satisfied within the constraints of the available 
technology 
• Unambiguity: requirement only has one interpretation 
• Traceability: requirement can be traced back to a higher level source and to 
the lower lever solution 
• Consistency: requirement does not conflict with other requirements 
• Verifiability: system can be tested against the requirement 
• Completeness: requirement does not lack relevant information 
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The requirements specification document can be fairly similar to a software 
requirements specification document. In an FPGA requirements specification document, 
there is additional information regarding FPGA-specific hardware issues such as 
capacity and performance requirements, circuit board size, radiation and 
electromagnetic disturbance tolerance, input/output response times, and clock 
frequencies (NRC, 2010a). 
One way of forming requirements is to use the Easy Approach to Requirements 
Syntax (SAREMAN, 2012) which is a requirement template that utilises common 
natural language expressions and keywords assigning them special meanings. The 
EARS is now presented as an example of how the requirements could actually look like. 
In the EARS, there are five sentence types: 
 
1. Ubiquitous: The <system name> shall <system response> 
2. Event driven: When <optional preconditions> <trigger>, the <system> shall 
<system response> 
3. State-driven: While <in a state>, the <system> shall <system response> 
4. Unwanted behaviour: If <optional preconditions> <trigger>, the <system> shall 
<system response> 
5. Optional: Where <feature>, the <system> shall <system response> 
A ubiquitous requirement describes a general attribute of the system e.g. “The System 1 
shall have five inputs” or “The indicator light shall blink once a second”. This type of a 
sentence can be used to describe both non-functional and functional requirements as 
demonstrated above respectively. 
An event-driven requirement sentence specifies a required response of the system to 
some triggering event. The keyword indicating the event-driven functionality is ‘when’. 
For example, the following requirement describes a simple functionality: “When input 
is activated, output shall be activated”. Now, the function is only initiated when the 
activation of the input signal is detected regardless of the subsequent state of the signal. 
A state-driven requirement sentence describes behaviour when a system or a signal 
is in a specified state. The keyword indicating a state-driven functionality is ‘while’. 
Now, the specified system response is required to take place when a system or a signal 
is in a specified state. For example, the following requirements describes a simple 
function: “While input 1 and input 2 are active, output shall be active” meaning quite 
axiomatically that while the input signals are in an active state at the same time, the 
output signal shall be made active. 
When there is a need to specify unwanted behaviour, the keywords used in the 
EARS are ‘if’ and ‘then’. The sentence structure is similar to the event-driven sentence. 
For example, describing a simple functionality: “If the buttons are pressed in the wrong 
order, then the system shall disregard them”. 
The final sentence type is ‘Optional’. This means that when a system has a certain 
feature, it shall cause a certain response. For example, “Where the automation system 
has support for model-based control, the system shall use a linear quadratic controller 
for process control”. This sentence type, along with the ubiquitous sentence type, is 
well suited for specifying non-functional requirements as well as functional 
requirements. 
The EARS sentences can be combined to achieve a requirement where e.g. a 
specified event along with a certain state causes a response. For example, such a 
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requirement could be: “When the input is activated, while the level is below the high 
limit, the pump shall be activated”. Now, a pump system can be activated by an ‘input’ 
when a certain level is below a specified limit. 
The required design properties can be formalised by using a formal language such 
as the Property Specification Language (PSL) (IEEE, 2010). PSL is an extension of 
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) that can be augmented into HDL code used in FPGA 
design. Formalised requirements are necessary for the employment of certain formal 
verification methods that are described in Section 2.4. 
 
Architectural design 
 
Architectural design consists of dividing the whole system into functional modules. 
Decisions about the module division, redundancy, and other architecture-related 
features are made in this phase. The division can be made so that it is possible to use 
pre-developed modules that are called intellectual property (IP) cores. By using an IP 
core, it is possible to implement the functionality of many basic logic functions and 
even an entire microprocessor. (Ranta, 2012) 
The architecture should be designed to be device independent. However, if an 
FPGA device has already been selected for the design, the designer should take into 
account the possible limitations of the particular device. If the architecture is 
sufficiently generic, the resulting document could be even used as a basis for 
developing an equivalent software application of the system as well. 
The results of architectural design should be a textual document that describes the 
architecture in natural language, and an architecture diagram illustrating the architecture 
graphically. The textual document should determine why the architecture has been 
defined as it is, and how the choices that were made are traceable to the requirements. 
The architecture diagram should illustrate the division to modules along with the other 
features mentioned above. A simple example of an architectural diagram is in Fig. 3. 
Input 1
Input 2
Input 3
Input 4
Input 5
Module 1 Module 2 Output
System
 
Figure 3: Illustration of the architecture of a very simple example system 
An illustration of the architecture of a simple system whose only output is active only 
when all the five inputs are active is in Fig. 3. In this very simple case, the modules 
(Module 1 and Module 2) in the figure would only consist of logical AND-blocks. 
Architectural design does not need to consider how the modules are implemented. 
The example in Fig. 3 shall be used in the upcoming design phases as well to illustrate 
the activities and the output products of each phase. The implementation of the modules 
using more elementary blocks is done in the detailed design phase which is described 
next.  
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Detailed design 
 
In detailed design, the modules that resulted from architectural design are defined in 
more detail i.e. the contents of the modules are designed. The desired functions of the 
modules are implemented using for example basic combinatorial logic gates, timers, 
lookup tables, memory elements, or other low-level function blocks. Also the internal 
redundancies, diagnostic features, built-in self-tests, and other non-functional features 
are designed into the modules in this phase.  
The architectural document should be refined into a more detailed logic circuit 
diagram. For creating the logic circuit diagram, symbols defined e.g. in the IEEE 
standard 91 can be used (IEEE, 1996). Together with architectural design, detailed 
design constitutes what is sometimes called the preliminary design phase (EPRI, 2009). 
The detailed design phase is already FPGA-dependent since the characteristics such 
as resources, and timing properties of the target FPGA need to be taken into account 
(Ranta, 2012). In addition to the detailed circuit diagram, there should be a detailed 
design document that contains information such as the I/O pin assignments, clock 
frequencies, and timing requirements. This information is vital for later design phases 
when the design is starting to morph into a hardware application. 
‘Module 2’ of the example system introduced in Fig. 3 would only consist of one 
two-input AND-block. A logic circuit diagram depicting Module 2 is in Fig. 4. In this 
case, the box that previously represented the module is now completed with a 
standardised shape of a two-input AND-block. 
Module 2
INPUT 2
INPUT 1 AND2
CLK
 
Figure 4: Detailed design logic circuit diagram of Module 2 of the example system 
containing a two-input AND-block 
In Fig. 4, there is now an additional input signal ‘CLK’ compared to the inputs in the 
architecture design. CLK represents the clock signal that drives all the blocks in a 
synchronous design. This is one of the hardware-related features that need to be 
implemented in the detailed design phase. A similar logic circuit diagram is created of 
all of the modules and of eventually of the entire system. 
 
Behavioural description 
 
Behavioural description corresponds to writing or generating code in software 
development. Instead of traditional programming languages such as C or Java, lower 
abstraction level hardware description languages (HDLs) are used. HDLs were 
originally used for making models of existing electronic devices for simulation and 
analysis purposes. However, it turned out that HDLs work the other way as well; they 
can be used for developing new hardware applications. 
In some cases, like in software development, the HDL code can be automatically 
generated from a higher level description using a software tool (Ranta, 2012). These 
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methods are described later on in this section. Most commonly used HDLs are Very 
high speed integrated circuit HDL (VHDL) (IEEE, 2009) and Verilog (IEEE, 2006). 
Based on various conference papers, reports, and discussions, VHDL seems to be more 
common in the nuclear domain (Druilhe et al., 2010; EPRI, 2009). 
VHDL resembles Ada which is a language that has been used for many safety- and 
mission critical applications (ISO/IEC, 2012). It is natural to use VHDL for 
implementing these kinds of systems in an FPGA, since it is based on a language that 
was designed for and has already been used in safety- and mission-critical applications. 
Ada and VHDL also have a good support for concurrent programming, which makes 
designing applications for the naturally concurrent FPGA devices easy. 
As an example, the two-input logical AND-block of the simple example system 
previously introduced, now written in VHDL, is in Program 1. The AND-block was 
used in the power limitation system (PLS) case study system described in Chapter 4. 
The PLS case study was implemented in VHDL, and more examples and explanations 
of VHDL are presented in Chapter 4 along with the rest of the case study. 
 
library ieee; 
use ieee.std_logic_1164.all; 
 
entity AND2GATE is 
   port ( CLK    : in  bit ;   
          INPUT1 : in  bit ;   
          INPUT2 : in  bit ;   
          OUTPUT : out bit ); 
end entity AND2GATE; 
     
 
architecture BEHAVIORAL of AND2GATE is 
   signal RESULT : bit; -- result is stored here before assigning to 
the output 
begin                                                           
   process ( CLK, INPUT1, INPUT2 ) is 
   begin 
      -- the AND-operation is done only when there is a rising edge on 
the clk signal 
      if CLK'event and CLK = '1' then 
      RESULT <= INPUT1 and INPUT2; 
      end if; 
   end process; 
    
   -- after each clk cycle, the result is assigned to the output port 
   OUTPUT <= RESULT; 
    
end architecture; 
 
Program 1: Two-input logical AND-block written in VHDL 
The result of the behavioural description is a so called register transfer level (RTL) 
model of the system. RTL model is a parallel model of an electronic circuit that 
describes the behaviour caused by signals being processed according to the configured 
logic and then transferred between memory registers synchronously (IEC, 2012). 
Behavioural description can be seen as a melting point of the software and hardware 
aspects of the FPGA design process. The RTL model is formed using a software-like 
method, e.g. writing the HDL code, but the concept of the RTL model or RTL level is 
commonly used in IC design (Wikipedia, 2013). The RTL design should be done so that 
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it is FPGA-independent. This enables better portability between devices, which in turn 
offers better obsolescence resistance, because for example an FPGA that is no longer 
available on the market could then be easily replaced by a newer FPGA. 
The higher-level methods enable describing the behaviour using another language 
such as C, Matlab, or LabVIEW (Ranta, 2012). This enables easier implementation of 
complex functions and can speed up the design process. This may however result in 
unnecessarily complex constructs and HDL code that is very difficult to read. That 
would make the verification of the HDL code more difficult. The need for the higher-
level design entries to be compiled into HDL code adds one more software tool into the 
already heavily software tool-dependent design process. This may impose an additional 
need to verify the tool to ensure that it does not generate errors during the compilation. 
Some higher-level languages are intended for hardware design. Examples of these 
are IEEE 1800 SystemVerilog (IEEE, 2007), IEEE 1666 SystemC (IEEE, 2012), and 
Esterel (Boussinot, 1991). They offer various useful features like built-in support for 
verification and validation methods such as formal verification. However, these 
languages are intended to make designing large and complex systems easier. 
Considering that NPP safety system applications are usually very simple, the higher-
level languages may not offer any added value to the design process. 
If the requirements were formalised using PSL, they could be directly augmented 
into the HDL code. PSL can be augmented into either VHDL or Verilog and it uses the 
boolean expressions of the underlying HDL to determine the states of the system. 
Additionally, it uses temporal logic to determine the behaviour of states in time domain. 
PSL generates assertions if certain properties are not met, i.e. if at some point the 
system is in a state that it should not be (Doulos, 2013). These assertions can then be 
used in simulation and formal verification to catch errors as will be seen in the V&V 
Section 2.4. 
The HDL code should be comprehensively commented and all the decisions that 
were made should be explicit in a way that tracing the properties of the code back to the 
previous phases is possible. There are some guides such as (ESA, 1994; NRC, 2010a) 
for writing good VHDL code. Therefore, producing additional documents in addition to 
the document that contains the HDL code is not necessary in this phase. 
 
Synthesis 
 
In synthesis, the HDL code is compiled and turned into a mid-level netlist. This netlist 
is usually generated in the textual electronic design interchange format (EDIF). Also a 
graphical schematic document that describes the gate-level design architecture is 
generated. EDIF netlist describes the blocks and interconnections in such a way that it is 
understood by software tools. EDIF is an FPGA-independent format whereas the 
schematic takes into account some internal resources and attributes of the specific 
FPGA device. An example of a schematic diagram is in Fig. 5. It is the two-input 
logical AND-block from the simple example whose VHDL code was presented in 
Program 1. The VHDL code was synthesised using the synthesis tool of Quartus II Suite 
by Altera (Altera, 2011). 
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Figure 5: Example of a schematic diagram (two-input logical AND-block) 
During synthesis, the logic block design is optimised and the ‘synthesisability’ of the 
written HDL code is also verified. Due to their original purpose of modelling existing 
systems, HDLs have many of the high-level features that are in many other 
programming languages as well. In Fig. 5, the synthesis tool has divided the AND-block 
into two parts: the combinatorial part and the register element. The box labelled 
“RESULT~0” is the combinatorial part where the AND operation is done, and the box 
labelled “RESULT” represents the signal in which the result of the AND operation is 
stored before assigning it to the output port. 
However, when creating hardware designs using an HDL, only a subset of the 
features of the language can be automatically turned into hardware. For example, only 
about ten per cent of VHDL is in the synthesisable subset that is defined in an extension 
of the IEEE 1076 standard named IEEE 1076-6 (IEEE, 2004). The reason that only a 
small subset of the language is synthesisable is that most features of the language are 
simply too complex for the software tools to automatically transform into hardware 
equivalents. 
The designer may skip the HDL coding of the behavioural description phase by 
manually creating the schematic diagram that results from synthesis. This method 
eliminates the possibility of errors introduced during HDL synthesis through the 
omission of the entire phase. It also gives the designer more control of the design. 
However, creating a schematic manually is very laborious and while for example the 
U.S. NRC still recommends it for safety-critical systems, it is expected to be replaced 
by the HDL method completely (NRC, 2010a). 
After the automatic synthesis, the designer may alter the output products in order to 
add features that might have been omitted during synthesis or to otherwise modify the 
design manually. This is called an engineering change order (ECO). ECOs are a 
potential source for introducing errors into the design, but proper verification should 
catch these errors as will be seen in the V&V Section 2.4. ECOs should be documented 
in order to maintain traceability, if the design structure changes dramatically because of 
them. 
 
Place and route 
 
The place and route (PAR) phase takes the design one step closer to becoming 
hardware. The EDIF netlist generated during synthesis is now used to create a model of 
the physical implementation of the design on the specific FPGA. Now the layout and 
configurations of the configurable logic blocks (CLBs), I/O blocks, and switchboxes are 
defined. 
The designer must specify for example to which pins the I/O ports of the design are 
connected, and what voltage should be used in the I/O pins. The designer can also affect 
how the CLBs are utilised. This means that the designer can affect which functions are 
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assigned to which particular CLBs. This can be done using a ‘floor plan’ editor usually 
provided in the software tool that is used for PAR. An image of a floor plan editor that 
is used to edit the physical layout of the two-input logical AND-block presented 
previously is in Fig. 6. The tool used for PAR was integrated in the Quartus II. 
 
Figure 6: Part of the physical layout model of the two-input logical AND-block 
In Fig. 6, one CLB on the blue background and four I/O pins on the brown background 
are shown. No other CLBs are utilised by the AND-block so the view has been zoomed 
in from the view where all CLBs and other resources are visible. The white rectangles 
on the blue background are the resources of one CLB. One of the rectangles is currently 
utilised which is indicated by the brown-red colouring. The combinatorial operation is 
done in the brown part and the result is stored in the red part. 
The boxes on the beige background represent I/O pins. Some of the ports such as 
INPUT1, and INPUT2, are assigned to the pins in the figure. The designer can assign 
the design components to different CLBs or I/O pins. The changes manually made in 
this phase are called ECOs like in synthesis. 
In addition to the model of the physical layout, a low-level netlist and a 
configuration file are generated. The netlist can be used for technology-level simulation. 
The configuration file is a bit stream that can be used to configure the specific FPGA 
device. For SRAM- and flash-based FPGAs, the configuration file is simply called a 
configuration file or a programming file, and for antifuse-based FPGAs, the 
configuration file is called a ‘burn list’ due to the nature of the configuration process. 
 
Configuration 
 
Configuration is the phase where the design is finally transferred to the FPGA by 
configuring it with the programming file. This phase is most often called 
‘programming’ and sometimes ‘implementation’ or ‘prototyping’. In this text, the term 
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‘configuration’ is used to avoid confusion with writing HDL code, and because it 
describes quite well what actually happens in the phase.  
The configuration process is physically somewhat different depending on the 
FPGA. Some FPGAs only need a personal computer (PC) and a universal serial bus 
(USB) cable whereas other FPGAs may require special equipment in order to access the 
configuration. 
SRAM-based FPGAs can either be directly configured using the joint test action 
group (JTAG) pins of the FPGA, or the configuration file can be transferred to an on-
board non-volatile memory. The memory is then used to configure the FPGA every 
time it is powered up. The JTAG configuration method takes only seconds while 
writing the configuration file into a non-volatile EEPROM or flash memory may take 
several minutes. 
A flash-based FPGA has the non-volatile memory built-in, so the configuration file 
is simply used to configure the internal flash transistors, i.e. the switchboxes, the CLBs, 
and the I/O blocks according to the design. Therefore, the configuration of a flash-based 
FPGA also takes minutes like the configuration of the non-volatile memory used with 
SRAM-based FPGAs. The flash FPGA needs to be erased before it can be re-
configured, and the erasing may take even longer than the actual configuration. 
The switchboxes of antifuse-based FPGAs are “burned” according to the burn list.  
Separating each interconnection, there are two conductors originally kept apart by a thin 
layer of amorphous silicon between them. When a high voltage is applied to it, the 
silicon turns into a conducting poly-crystalline silicon metal alloy thus letting the 
current flow through (Ranta, 2012). 
After the configuration is completed, the CLBs, I/O blocks, and switchboxes should 
be configured according to the design. After this is completed, the FPGA should 
automatically begin to execute the specified functionality when it is powered up. 
 
Integration 
 
Integration is the final phase in which the FPGA is connected to other devices. If there 
is no circuit board to which the FPGA is already connected, this phase also includes the 
circuit board design and fabrication, and the mounting of the FPGA on the board. The 
FPGA circuit board is placed for example in a computer cabinet or a rack among other 
instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment. Or, depending on the application, it can 
be installed for example inside a car or a mobile phone. From this point on, the FPGA 
design can be seen as blending into the overall I&C system design. 
2.4 Verification and Validation 
Since the FPGA application is susceptible to errors in all design phases, the design 
needs to go through a V&V process. The purpose of V&V is to show that the products 
of each design phase meet their requirements and fulfil their intended use and purpose. 
Verification is a process where it is determined if the product of a design phase fulfils 
the requirements imposed by a previous design phase. Validation is a process where it is 
determined if the product of the whole design process is correct and fulfils the original 
intended purpose. (IAEA, 1999) 
However, in the industry, the use and definitions of the terms ‘verification’ and 
‘validation’ vary, and in this text the term ‘V&V’ is used as a single entity although 
some of the phases could contain only verification or validation. The semantic meaning 
of ‘V&V’ in this document is the process of acquiring evidence of the correctness or 
incorrectness of a given application or design through various methods. 
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Since there is no one definitive guide to FPGA V&V, especially for NPP safety 
systems, the activities described in this section are collected from various sources. 
Many activities especially in the early stages of development are very close to or the 
same as those used in software development. Toward the end, the V&V activities are 
more hardware oriented and FPGA specific. It has been argued that the lesser 
complexity of FPGAs makes V&V easier than software V&V (NRC, 2009a; EPRI 
2009). However, the additional design phases specific to FPGAs impose new V&V 
requirements that require knowledge of the hardware aspects similarly to the design 
process. 
Overall, the V&V methods can be roughly divided into three categories: reviews, 
testing, and formal verification. Many of the V&V phases employ methods from more 
than one of these categories. In this section, the three categories are first briefly 
described after which the V&V activities related to each design phase are described in 
more detail. 
 
Review 
 
A review is a semi-formal gathering where the designer presents the document to an 
audience that consists of e.g. other designers and/or independent auditors. The 
document is walked through step by step, and the audience, already familiar with the 
document, should question all aspects of it and try to find errors. In the end, corrections 
and additions to the design document are made. (IAEA, 1999) 
Traceability analysis may be conducted during a review. It aims to verify that the 
properties of a product of a given design phase are traceable back to the requirements 
imposed by the preceding design phases. Also the requirements should be traceable to 
the products of the design phases in order to verify that all requirements have been met. 
For example, a duplicated logic block in the RTL model may first be traced back to 
detailed design, where a decision to duplicate the block was made. Architectural design 
document mentions that some form of redundancy is required in the module. The 
redundancy requirement may then be traced back to the system requirements. Thus, the 
duplicated block in the RTL model has been traced back to the requirements. 
 
Testing 
 
Testing refers to the verification of the functionality of the design through different 
methods that are based on running the system in some way. Testing can be divided into 
static and dynamic testing. The difference between these is that static testing is 
challenging the design without executing its functions, e.g. program code, and dynamic 
testing refers to challenging the design through execution of its functions (EPRI, 1995). 
Static testing includes different kinds of analyses of the source code. Review-like 
activities may sometimes be regarded as part of static testing (EPRI, 1995). For 
software, there are methods that test such properties as logical correctness, performance 
and timing, different failure modes, and interface and data transfer properties. Many of 
the methods are most likely applicable to FPGA designs especially in the behavioural 
description phase, since the product of that phase resembles a low complexity software 
source code. 
Dynamic testing of FPGAs can be divided into two parts: simulation and hardware 
verification. Simulation enables the testing of arbitrary input combinations that might be 
non-testable on actual hardware. These combinations are necessary to test because 
during failures, some inputs may get values that are extremely improbable during 
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normal operation. Simulation can be performed against the requirements or statistically 
by using random-generated input vectors. 
Dynamic timing analysis is also performed during simulation in the later design 
phases. Timing analysis refers to determining the propagation and execution delays of 
the signals and functions of the design (Ranta, 2012). 
Simulation also provides almost unlimited observability of the design. Observability 
determines how much of the FPGA’s internal functionality can be observed during 
operation. During the operation of FPGAs, only the I/O ports assigned to pins that are 
accessible can be monitored, which means that observability is very limited. (EPRI, 
2009) 
During simulation, any of the internal signals can be observed in the simulation 
tool. For small designs and when appropriate I/O devices are present, it is possible in 
the hardware implementation to assign some internal signals to observable I/O ports. 
This may be useful at least when testing parts of the design on the hardware. The 
limiting factor is most likely the amount of observable I/O pins and monitoring 
equipment. 
Hardware testing is done after the FPGA is configured. The methods for hardware 
testing depend on the platform on which the FPGA is mounted. For example, some 
development kits offer built-in switches, LEDs, and screens that can be used to give 
inputs and observe the outputs of the FPGA (Altera, 2006; Microsemi, 2012a). 
Typically such a development kit also provides an interface for serial communication, 
which enables the communication between a PC and the FPGA. This enables the use of 
the same inputs in hardware testing that were used in simulation. 
 
Formal verification 
 
Formal verification is based on mathematically verifying different aspects of a design in 
the different design phases. Formal verification requires a model of the system, special 
tools and skills, and properly formalised requirements against which the properties of 
the design can be compared. Formal methods for FPGAs can be used to both validate 
the model of a system against the requirements, and to verify that no unintentional 
changes to the design have occurred after certain design phases. 
Model checking is a formal verification method where all possible behaviours 
caused by all possible inputs of a model of the system are checked (Clarke et al., 1999).  
Model checking is not a brute force method such as simulation, but instead based on 
exhaustively looking for certain properties in a tree-type data structure. The model is 
checked against the formalised requirements, and if the model’s behaviour violates the 
specification, the model checker gives a counter-example that shows how and why the 
specified property was violated. Model checking originates from hardware verification 
where it first proved to be effective for verifying large and complex ICs such as 
microprocessors (Burch et al., 1992; Fix, 2008). 
Logic equivalence checking (LEC) is another type of a formal verification method 
related to FPGAs. LEC can be done after synthesis and place and route using special 
software tools to verify that the logic has not changed as a result of the optimisations 
and modifications during these phases. Where model checking verifies the correct 
functioning, equivalence checking only verifies the equivalence of the design in 
different phases i.e. it does not reveal design errors. (Simpson, 2010) 
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The activities related to different V&V phases in Fig. 2 are listed in Table 1. In the 
table, each row represents activities related to a particular V&V phase, and each column 
represents one of the three approaches described above. Explanations of each V&V 
phase and the related activities are then given in the following text. 
Table 1: The V&V activities and methods related to different V&V phases organised in 
three categories 
 Review Formal 
Verification 
Testing 
Requirements 
V&V 
Requirements 
review, 
Formalised 
requirements 
review 
  
Architecture 
V&V 
Architecture 
review 
 Simulation 
Detailed 
Design V&V 
Logic circuit 
review, Hardware 
specification 
review 
Model checking Logic Circuit 
Simulation 
Behaviour V&V HDL code review Model checking RTL simulation, 
static analyses 
Synthesis V&V EDIF netlist 
review,  
schematic diagram 
review 
Model checking, 
logic 
equivalence 
checking 
Gate-level 
simulation 
Place and 
Route V&V 
Physical layout 
model review 
Model checking, 
logic 
equivalence 
checking 
Technology-
level 
simulation, 
static timing 
analysis 
Configuration 
V&V 
 
 
 FPGA testing, 
verification of 
configuration 
Integration 
V&V 
  Operational 
tests, circuit 
board tests 
The activities in Table 1 are merely the ones identified so far in various sources. 
Additional activities and methods most likely exist and are extensively in use. However, 
using the methods in the table already produces a good amount of evidence of the 
correctness or incorrectness of the design under V&V. 
Requirements V&V 
Requirements V&V aims to determine if the requirements specification completely and 
correctly describes the system and that the specified system satisfies its purpose (EPRI, 
1995). Many errors in finished applications can be traced back to requirements, i.e. the 
application may meet the requirements but the requirements are erroneous and thus the 
application is too. The requirements specification is usually a textual document which 
means that the main method for requirements V&V is requirements review. 
In requirements review, the requirements are also verified against the characteristics 
of a good requirement that were presented in Section 2.3. The verification of traceability 
is also known as ‘traceability analysis’, and since it is an important part of the 
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verification, it is often regarded as a separate V&V activity from the review. If the 
requirements were formalised using for example PSL or LTL, they should be reviewed 
as well. Their compliance with the natural language requirements should be verified. 
 
Architecture V&V 
 
Architecture V&V deals with the results of the architectural design phase. The results of 
the design phase are the architecture document and some form of diagram illustrating 
the designed system architecture. The architecture document should be reviewed, and 
the design choices that were made should be traced back to the requirements. The 
review is important, since errors found in these early phases are again much cheaper to 
correct than errors found later on due to the amount of work done. The architecture 
diagram is reviewed and its contents are traced back to the architecture document. 
Functional simulation may also be possible. However, the architectural design may be 
of too high abstraction level, which would make simulation using a software tool quite 
difficult. 
 
Detailed design V&V 
 
Detailed design V&V is related to the detailed design phase. A detailed design 
document defines the modules in the architectural design document. In addition to 
defining the logic, some hardware-related issues need to be considered. Therefore, two 
kinds of things need to be verified in this phase: the correctness of the designed logic 
and the accuracy of the hardware-related characteristics. 
The verification of the logic may include a review, functional simulation, and model 
checking. Typically the detailed design logic circuit diagram consists of simpler 
elementary blocks than the architectural design diagram which should make simulation 
in detailed design V&V more viable than in architectural V&V. There exist third party 
software tools such as the Simulink extension of Matlab that can be used for simulating 
basic logic circuit diagrams (Mathworks, 2012). 
Model checking can be used for function block-based designs such as the detailed 
design diagram. Models of such designs are easy to build as the higher-level functions 
of the designs are implicitly defined by combining generic low-level blocks in a certain 
way. The functions of the low-level blocks are very easy to implement. 
 The hardware-related characteristics can be verified against the datasheet or any 
other document that contains the necessary information about the FPGA device. It 
should contain information about the FPGA resources such as amount of CLBs, I/O 
pins, clock frequencies, voltage levels, and timing properties. It should be verified that it 
is possible to implement the design in the specific FPGA in terms of the hardware 
capabilities. 
 
Behavioural description V&V 
 
In behavioural description V&V, the results of the behavioural description design phase 
are gone through. The HDL code resulting from behavioural description is very similar 
to regular software source code. The difference is that HDL code is typically less 
complex than software code, since only subsets of HDLs are synthesisable. Similar 
reviews as in software development are therefore viable for HDL code as well. It may 
even be easier due to the lesser complexity. 
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Many of the same testing methods that are used in software code can be used for HDL 
code as well. Static testing methods such as flow graph analyses and timing analyses are 
suitable for HDL code (Balboni et al., 1994). Simulation is an important method for 
verifying the correctness of the RTL model. For simulation, an additional test bench 
needs to be created for example by using an HDL. An instance of the design HDL 
module of the system is created inside the test bench module. The test bench can then 
assign any signals to the I/O ports of the system, and thus emulate an operating 
environment. 
One challenge is to create a test bench with enough coverage of the functionality of 
the system. For simple designs, it may be possible to cover all the states through all 
possible input combinations, but usually the amount of states is so vast that simulating 
all of them would take too much time. The test bench input vectors should derive from 
the requirements. If the formal design property requirements were augmented into the 
HDL code in PSL format, the simulator could make use of the assertions that are 
generated if the system’s behaviour violates a property. 
These same assertions are used in model checking. The tool used to do model 
checking does not execute the code but instead mathematically examines all possible 
behaviours of the system model and verifies them against formalised requirements. In 
recent years, the use of model checking has been studied in relation to safety-critical 
software verification (Lahtinen et al., 2012). One commercial model checking tool that 
has been used in NPP related projects is IBM’s RuleBase (Daumas et al., 2012) but 
there are also good experiences of open source tools, such as NuSMV (Cavada et al., 
2010; Björkman et al., 2009). 
 
Synthesis V&V 
 
Synthesis V&V deals with the results of the synthesis design phase. Both products of 
synthesis, the EDIF netlist and the schematic diagram, can be subject to reviews. 
However, an informal inspection by the designer or an EDIF or schematic expert is 
most likely enough, because for example structural anomalies introduced during 
synthesis should be revealed by other synthesis verification methods. In addition to 
conducting the reviews, two things need to be verified after synthesis: the logical 
equivalence with the RTL model, and the correct behaviour. 
In synthesis, the logic is optimised and implemented to function as effectively as 
possible and to use as little resources as possible. If the designer has for example made 
certain blocks redundant to increase reliability and mitigate the effect of SEEs (Ranta, 
2012), the synthesis tool might falsely interpret the redundant blocks as unnecessary and 
remove them during synthesis. To verify the equivalence, LEC should be conducted. 
There are such LEC tools as Conformal LEC by Cadence (Yarom et al., 2006) and 
FormalPro by Mentor Graphics (Mentor Graphics, 2008). 
The second thing to verify in synthesis V&V is that the behaviour has not changed 
during the automated procedure. It can be done in gate-level simulation and utilising 
model checking. The gate-level simulation is sometimes referred to as ‘post-synthesis 
simulation’ or ‘logic-level simulation’. The simulation needs to be done using the exact 
same inputs that were used when simulating the RTL model in order to correctly verify 
the behavioural equality of the two products.  
To utilise model checking, a model is created based on the synthesised gate-level 
schematic diagram. The same formalised requirements can then be checked using the 
new model. The EDIF netlist might also be used to create a model for model checking 
because it is a formal representation of the design. 
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In synthesis, some FPGA resources are taken into account, which may cause some 
additional delays or other hardware imposed issues to show up in the simulation results. 
At this phase, the delays are not yet necessarily realistic but they may cause the RTL 
simulation and gate-level simulation results to differ. The possible differences should be 
analysed and their effect on the design should be determined and documented (NRC, 
2010a). 
 
Place and route V&V 
 
The activities related to place and route V&V are similar to the ones in synthesis V&V. 
The netlist generated in PAR is very low-level which might make reviewing it difficult. 
The configuration file is also out of the scope of reviews, since its format is not intended 
to be graphically presented. The physical layout model however can be reviewed at 
least by the designer especially if there are some special requirements regarding the 
placement of the CLBs. 
After PAR, the hardware-related aspects are realistic, which means that they can be 
verified against the detailed design document that specifies for example pin 
assignments, voltages, etc. The timing properties can be verified through technology-
level simulation of the low-level netlist. Technology-level simulation is sometimes 
referred to as ‘post-layout simulation’. 
The simulation needs to be done using the same inputs as in the gate-level 
simulation in synthesis V&V. These inputs were the same that were used in the RTL 
simulation. Doing this helps to ensure that the behaviour of the design has not changed 
during the several conversions of the design. It might be possible to create a model 
based on the physical layout model. The model could then be used in model checking. 
In addition to the simulation, the LEC performed in synthesis V&V can similarly be 
performed after PAR. Its purpose is also to verify that the design has not changed as a 
result of the PAR procedure. If there have been ECOs, their effects on the design need 
to be determined and documented. 
One activity specific to PAR verification is static timing analysis (STA). STA 
utilises a tool to cover all the signal paths in the design to verify their timing properties. 
Generally, the propagation delays through wirings and CLBs configured in a certain 
way are known, and with the physical layout available, the delays can be analytically 
calculated. STA can be performed to the EDIF netlist resulting from synthesis but, as 
mentioned before, the delay values in the EDIF netlist are often non-realistic. (Ranta, 
2012) 
 
Configuration V&V 
 
In configuration V&V, after the FPGA has been configured according to the 
configuration file, its correct behaviour needs to be verified. Errors may be introduced 
during the configuration process. The FPGA testing is conducted using hardware-
generated inputs whose values need to be the same as in all the simulations in the 
previous phases (NRC, 2010a). Differences between the results of the technology-level 
simulation and FPGA testing indicate errors in the configuration process. 
There are methods to verify the correctness of these processes. In some cases, the 
configuration of an FPGA can be read back from the device (Altera, 2006). These 
features may not be included in all types of FPGAs. The read back can also be disabled 
for security reasons (Microsemi, 2012b). 
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Integration V&V 
 
In integration V&V, when the FPGA has been mounted on the circuit board and placed 
into its operating environment, the correct functioning is validated against the 
requirements. The input vectors do not need to be exactly the same as in the previous 
tests but it needs to cover the expected operation inputs as well as unexpected operation 
inputs in order to verify that there are no unexpected responses (NRC, 2010a). If the 
inputs are generated by the actual operating environment, e.g. sensors or buttons, 
arbitrary input values, which may be included in the previous input vectors, may not 
even be possible to produce. 
The aim of the integration V&V is also to verify that all the peripheral devices on 
the circuit board function correctly with the FPGA. These include external memory 
elements, analogue to digital (A/D) and digital to analogue (D/A) converters, power 
sources, I/O buffers, etc. The detailed testing of the peripheral devices is out of the 
scope of this document. After this phase, the V&V activities are more related to the 
overall instrumentation and control system V&V.  
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3 Nuclear Power Plant Safety Automation 
Applications 
This chapter concentrates on the FPGA-based NPP safety automation applications. The 
chapter is organised in six sections. A short overview is first provided in Section 3.1. 
Then, the essential NPP safety functions and design principles relevant to the FPGA 
technology are briefly described in Section 3.2. Challenges related to the use of 
conventional microprocessor-based software technology in NPP safety automation are 
elaborated in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, the perceived advantages and disadvantages 
related to the use of the FPGA technology in NPP safety automation are described. A 
comparison of the features of the FPGA and its main rival, the microprocessor-based 
software technology, is given in Section 3.5. Finally, some examples of actual NPP 
safety automation applications incorporating FPGAs are given in Section 3.6. 
3.1 Overview 
The interest toward the use of the FPGA technology in NPP safety automation is rising 
internationally as the various advantages of the FPGAs over the currently used 
microprocessor-based software technology are being recognised. The typically high 
complexity and the difficulties in demonstrating the safety of traditional software-based 
applications are among the reasons that have led the nuclear power utilities and I&C 
system developers to look for new technologies such as the FPGA for implementing the 
safety automation applications. 
Although rather new in the nuclear power industry, FPGAs are already in use in the 
safety automation systems of several NPPs around the world. One way to use an FPGA 
is in a modernising project to replace obsolete technology such as a microprocessor no 
longer available in the market (Druilhe, 2010). FPGA-based systems can also be used as 
diverse backups for software-based primary systems, but there are also examples of the 
entire I&C platforms implemented using FPGAs (EPRI, 2009). 
The rigid licensing process and demanding requirements related to NPP safety 
automation and the lack of internationally consistent regulatory guidance and standards 
regarding FPGAs in NPPs have hindered the widespread adoption of FPGA-based in 
NPP safety automation. As there is still rather little experience of operational FPGA-
based systems in NPPs, the basis for writing consistent regulatory guidance regarding 
FPGAs in NPP safety automation is not yet strong. However, work is being done to 
come up with internationally consistent standards and guidance that address the design 
and V&V issues specific to the FPGA technology. 
To promote the technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) holds 
annual workshops where regulators, system vendors, power utilities, and researchers 
from different countries come together to discuss different aspects of the development 
and use of the FPGA technology in NPPs. The IAEA is currently working toward 
publishing a document addressing different aspects of the FPGA design and V&V 
(IAEA, 2013). One goal of the workshops has been to determine what the publication 
should contain. 
The FPGA technology itself is quite mature, and has been used in other fields in 
several safety- and mission-critical applications for many years. It is only a matter of 
refining the design and V&V methods to fulfil the demanding requirements of the 
nuclear power industry and getting more operational experience through more 
implemented systems before the technology can make its final breakthrough. 
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3.2 Essentials of NPP Safety Automation 
This section briefly describes what the main tasks of the NPP safety automation 
applications relevant to the use of FPGAs are, and what the basic design principles are. 
In a nuclear power plant, the three most important functions to ensure safety are the 
shutdown of the reactor, the removal of the residual heat from the core, and the 
confinement of radioactivity (IAEA, 2002). During normal operation, the process 
control systems are able to perform these functions. If the process control systems fail to 
perform the functions, certain dedicated safety systems take control of the situation. 
The safety systems consist of the actuating devices that physically perform the 
functions, and the safety automation system, commonly referred to as the reactor 
protection system, which detects deviations from normal operating states and forms the 
signals necessary for the actuators to initiate the execution of the safety functions 
(IAEA, 2002). 
The safety automation functions are typically simple. For example, one of the most 
important safety systems is the reactor shutdown system that receives measurement 
signals of the reactor variables such as reactor power, coolant water temperature and 
reactor pressure. The system compares the values of the signals to the threshold values, 
and then either remains inactive, or forms and sends initiating signals to the control rod 
actuators and other systems to initiate the shutdown. 
The safety requirements in the nuclear power industry are among the most 
demanding of all industries. To improve the safety and reliability of the systems, it is 
often required that they incorporate features such as redundancy and diversity. An 
important requirement often met by using these features is that no failure of a single 
system should lead to accident conditions (IAEA, 2002). A failure of multiple systems 
due to the same cause is called a common cause failure. The mitigation of common 
cause failures is a key design principle in NPP safety automation, and systems that are 
independent, redundant, and diverse are typically quite resistant to common cause 
failures. 
Redundancy refers to implementing a function using multiple identical or diverse 
systems that can each perform the same function independent of the others (IAEA, 
2007). Common types of redundancy are e.g. two-out-of-four (2oo4) redundancy and 
triple-modular redundancy (TMR). For example, a protection system can use four 
sensors and a 2oo4 voting to determine if a certain pressure is too high or too low. An 
illustration of a 2oo4-redundant system is in Fig. 7. 
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Figure 7: An illustration of a two-out-of-four redundant system 
The systems 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Fig. 7 perform the same functions based on the redundant 
inputs. The output of each system is conveyed to a 2oo4-voter. Each voter thus 
determines the correct output and the four redundant OUTPUT-signals should be 
identical if everything functions correctly. The OUTPUT-signals can then be used e.g. 
as inputs for other 2oo4 redundant systems. 
Diversity is usually required in redundant systems. Employing diversity is a good 
way to increase the independence between systems through e.g. monitoring different 
process parameters, using different technology, logic, algorithms or means of actuation 
in order to provide several different methods to get information from the process and to 
control it (IAEA, 2002).  
Diversity can also be applied to humans by e.g. having different teams design the 
redundant systems. Diversity is an effective means against common cause failures. 
Sufficiently diverse systems are less likely to have the same errors or to experience a 
failure due to the malfunction of e.g. a certain power source or a sensor of a particular 
manufacturer than systems using the same components. 
3.3 Software-based digital technology 
Digital technology has been used in NPP I&C systems since the 1980s (EPRI, 2009). 
Old analogue systems were replaced by microcontrollers, programmable logic 
controllers and distributed control systems, which all are based on microprocessors 
running some form of software (EPRI, 2009). Digital technology was initially used only 
in systems such as data collection systems and information displays that are not 
important to safety. Since then, they have also been widely adopted in systems such as 
reactor control and monitoring systems, turbine automation, and emergency diesel 
generators and they are becoming increasingly common in the most critical safety 
systems as well (IAEA, 2000). 
Digital technology offers numerous advantages compared to traditional analogue 
technology. These include easier implementation of complex functionality such as 
improved process monitoring, interface, diagnostics, and testing. Digital systems are 
considered more accurate, stable, and flexible than traditional analogue hardware-based 
systems. They are also said to offer economic advantages over traditional analogue 
systems since less hardware is needed to implement a complex function using digital 
programmable technology. (IAEA, 2000) 
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One difficulty of using software-based digital systems to implement NPP safety systems 
is related to demonstrating their safety for licensing. Where traditional hardware failures 
are usually considered random and occur due to aging, wear, stress, etc., the nature of 
software failures is considered deterministic instead. Software does not age or become 
worn but it can still fail due to errors introduced during the design. Also, the hardware 
running the software is subject to the same failures as any other piece of hardware. To 
verify that the design does not contain errors, proper V&V processes are necessary 
during the design of software applications. 
The software V&V is difficult due to the complex nature of the applications. Using 
software, there is a risk that the applications easily become unnecessarily complex. 
Traditional simulation and testing methods can cover all possible states of only very 
simple systems. Although safety applications are simple, usually the state space of the 
software implementations becomes so vast that it would take years to test all possible 
behaviours through simulation. There are formal methods such as model checking that 
can be used to mathematically check all the possible behaviours of a system (Clarke et 
al., 1992). However, the formal methods typically require expertise and special 
knowledge about the methods. Also, the requirements that are checked need to be 
formalised and a suitable model of the system needs to be created. 
On top of the actual software application algorithms, there is some overhead 
complexity that results from the need for an operating system to switch between 
different tasks in the application. Different applications typically run on the same 
microprocessor that can only execute one task at a time. This makes truly separating the 
actual safety functions and the supporting functions from each other difficult or even 
impossible in software-based systems. (EPRI, 2009) 
One solution could be to use multicore microprocessors. The important functions 
could be assigned to a dedicated CPU and would therefore be independent from the 
other functions. However, multicore microprocessor applications are considered to be 
even more complex than traditional single core applications which may lessen the 
advantages of having independent execution of certain functions. Still, the technology is 
constantly evolving and in the near future, there may be modern multicore processors 
that are tailored for use in safety-critical systems. (Ranta, 2013) 
As the development of the microprocessor technology is not driven by the safety 
critical industry but instead the consumer market, the characteristics of modern 
microprocessors are not optimal for safety-critical applications. They are typically very 
complex, contain many functions not needed in safety-critical applications, and their 
lifetime is too short for the decades of operation required in an NPP. The safety 
functions need to share the same resources with the support functions on the 
microprocessor, which makes deterministic demonstration of the correctness of the 
safety application difficult (Arndt et al., 2012). 
The difficulties with designing and implementing the digital automation 
applications have led to delays in some NPP construction projects. For example, in the 
Finnish Olkiluoto 3 NPP currently under construction, there have been problems with 
the independence between the process control and the safety automation systems 
(STUK, 2009). 
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3.4 Use of the FPGA technology – advantages and 
disadvantages 
FPGAs have been on the market for nearly thirty years, and in the past ten years, they 
have become increasingly advanced and capable of implementing complex 
functionality. Thus, they are now seen as a viable alternative for implementing safety-
critical NPP safety automation applications. The use of the FPGA technology has also 
some disadvantages that are mainly related to the complex design process and the 
novelty of the technology in the nuclear power industry. This section describes how the 
FPGA technology can be used in NPP safety automation and what are the related 
advantages and disadvantages. 
FPGAs are capable of performing practically any logic functionality with the 
limiting factor being only the capacity of the device i.e. how many functions can be 
implemented using the CLBs of the device. Therefore, FPGAs can be used in any NPP 
system that involves logic functions, e.g. in protection systems, actuation decision 
systems, and communication systems (NRC, 2010a). 
In the current regulations and standards, there are some inconsistencies with issues 
such as what even constitutes an FPGA. In some documents, the FPGA is considered to 
be e.g. a programmable logic device (PLD), or a complex programmable logic device 
(CPLD), both of which are similar to but nonetheless different from the FPGA. Issues 
such as this have prevented the FPGA-based system vendors and developers from fully 
understanding the regulatory requirements in a way that would enable them to produce 
applications that meet the regulations (Arndt et al., 2012). This probably has in its part 
hindered the adoption of the technology in the nuclear power industry. 
In 2012, the IEC published the standard 62566 entitled “Nuclear power plants – 
Instrumentation and control important to safety – Development of HDL-programmed 
integrated circuits for systems performing category A functions” (IEC, 2012). The title 
suggests that the standard provides comprehensive development guidance for FPGA 
applications (as they are HDL-programmed integrated circuits). 
However, according to the discussions at the Fifth International Workshop on the 
Application of FPGAs in Nuclear Power Plants held in Beijing in 2012, the IEC 
standard 62566 should only be used as an informative reference. The contents of the 
standard are not as comprehensive as was initially expected, and in many parts, there 
are just references to other e.g. software-related standards. 
Typically, an NPP safety automation application deals with concurrent 
measurement and data processing tasks because there are many subsystems such as 
sensors transmitting information simultaneously. There are many functions that need to 
be independent of each other and executed concurrently. As FPGAs operate naturally 
concurrently, and all of the functions can be executed simultaneously and 
independently, they are suitable for implementing these kinds of NPP safety automation 
applications. 
The performance of FPGAs far exceeds the requirements for NPP safety automation 
applications. Typically, the functions need to be executed within tens of milliseconds or 
even more (EPRI, 2009). FPGAs typically operate at clock frequencies of tens or 
hundreds of megahertz which, accompanied with the naturally concurrent processing of 
FPGAs, means that the response time requirements are easily met. 
FPGA technology can be made resistant to obsolescence by designing the 
applications in an appropriate way. If the design has been implemented using e.g. 
VHDL, it should be device independent and thus easily portable to other FPGAs. This is 
an effective measure against obsolescence because when the time comes to replace the 
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aged and worn FPGA, it can most likely be easily replaced with a currently available 
device (EPRI, 2009). 
An FPGA can be used to implement even software-based applications if necessary. 
For example, if a microprocessor that is no longer available on the market is needed, it 
can be emulated on an FPGA by using an IP core that is a predefined block 
implementing the functionality of e.g. an entire microprocessor (Daumas, 2012). Then, 
using the emulated processor, software applications can be run on the FPGA. 
The fact that so many functionalities can be implemented inside a single FPGA chip 
means that the use FPGAs can significantly reduce the amount of different hardware 
needed to implement functions (EPRI, 2009). There are many ready-made IP cores that 
can be used for implementing e.g. digital signal processing, finite impulse response 
filters, or Fast Fourier Transform calculation that may be needed in NPP safety 
automation applications (NRC, 2009a). 
FPGAs are suitable for implementing features that conform to the basic design 
principles of NPP safety automation applications. The principles include redundancy, 
diversity, and independence as described in Section 3.2. As the FPGA is naturally 
modular, redundancy can be easily implemented on various levels. Individual logic 
blocks, larger modules, or even the complete logic can be made redundant within the 
same chip. The fact that the functions of an FPGA are independent means that applying 
redundancy inside the chip is meaningful since the disturbances caused by e.g. radiation 
may only affect certain CLBs instead of the entire chip. 
In addition to the actual safety functions, there are also supporting features such as 
communication and data processing in NPP safety automation applications. In the 
nuclear industry, a common requirement is that the safety features should be separated 
from the supporting features to achieve independence of the functions. Each CLB in an 
FPGA is implemented in physically separate transistors and is thus independent from 
the others (EPRI, 2009). This means that separation of the functions from each other is 
not only possible but also quite effortless when using FPGAs. 
The use of the FPGA technology as a diverse backup system alongside a 
microprocessor-based primary system is one of the common applications of the FPGA 
technology in NPP safety automation. The different structure and operating principle of 
an FPGA bring physical and functional diversity into the design. 
However, since the current regulations regarding diversity do not offer specific 
guidance on this subject, it is unclear what degree of diversity the FPGA offers for an 
NPP safety automation application (Arndt et al., 2012). Additionally, the software-like 
design process is susceptible to similar errors as software design which may affect the 
degree of diversity compared to software. Furthermore, the limited amount of available 
software tools may also be harmful to diversity because even if the application was 
created using different language and different designers, if the same software tool is 
used in the process, similar errors might be introduced into the design (Arndt et al., 
2012). 
The FPGA manufacturers all have proprietary tools for developing applications for 
their FPGAs. As the development of the tools is not driven by the safety-critical 
requirements and the requirements for NPP safety automation applications are 
demanding, each product of each design phase where a software tool is used needs to be 
verified to detect errors possibly introduced during the use of the tool. 
The verification of the tools is difficult because the outputs of a tool typically 
cannot be compared to the outputs of another tool because of the tool-dependence of the 
device (Arndt et al., 2012). Based on the discussions at the Fifth International 
Workshop on the Application of FPGAs in NPPs, the need to verify the software tools 
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is one of the issues related to the use of the FPGA technology in NPP safety automation 
applications. 
Even though the verification of the software tools used in the FPGA design process 
is difficult, there are many good methods for the V&V of the resulting FPGA 
application. Where the safety justification has traditionally been a challenge with digital 
software-based technology, the lower complexity of the FPGA applications is said to 
make the justification easier by enabling more comprehensive and simpler V&V 
methods for providing evidence of the correctness of the application. Even though the 
design process is rather complex, the design products can be comprehensively verified 
after each phase of the process. 
It is argued in (EPRI, 2009) that the observability of the FPGA designs may be 
limited i.e. all the states and signals in the system may not be accessible for observation. 
However, provided there are suitable I/O devices, practically any internal signal can be 
assigned to an output port that can be observed. The size of the design and the number 
of output ports that can be observed seem to be the only limiting factors in this practice. 
Because many NPP safety automation functions involving timed sequences operate 
in the second-scale and clocks of FPGAs operate in the nanosecond-scale, the realistic 
simulation of the designs may be difficult. In the simulation, the clock signal needs to 
be generated by implementing a binary variable that changes its value e.g. every few 
nanoseconds. When simulating a multiple-second operation cycle of the application, it 
takes a very long time to even get through the first second of operation. The simulation 
may thus need to be done using a much slower clock frequency which may affect the 
integrity of the simulation as a verification method. 
An easy solution for this problem could be to use a significantly slower hardware 
clock with the FPGA. The problems regarding the large clock frequency would be 
avoided. However, as the NPP safety automation applications should be synchronous, in 
which case the signals propagate between the blocks only when there is a rising edge on 
the clock signal, a significantly slower clock could cause problems with meeting the 
response time requirements. 
The security of an FPGA during the operation is good because it has a simple 
structure and unlike in software, there are no operating systems or general purpose 
functions that would be easy to hijack by a malicious application or an attack. Also, 
because the re-configuration of an FPGA can be made difficult or even permanently 
impossible (with antifuse-based FPGAs and some flash-based FPGAs), the security 
grows even better (EPRI, 2009). However, when emulating a microprocessor on an 
FPGA, the similar security issues apply as with software.  
The main challenges regarding security seem to be related to the software tool-
dependent design process (Arndt et al., 2012). As the outputs of the tools are difficult to 
verify, unauthorised alterations to the design are possible if good informational security 
practices are not employed during the design process. 
The physical lifetime of an FPGA device is also something that needs to be 
considered in NPP applications. Typically in mobile phones or other consumer 
electronics applications where FPGAs are used, the expected lifetime of a product may 
only be a few years whereas NPPs may be intended to be operated for as long as fifty 
years. Although modernisations are inevitable at some point in the plant’s lifetime, the 
I&C system could still expected to be operational for tens of years. It has been reported 
that e.g. the contemporary trend of using lead-free soldering may cause problems with 
the longevity of the connectors and configuration in prolonged use because a 
phenomenon called whisker growth can affect the solders and cause failures (NRC, 
2010a).  
33 
 
In some applications in NPPs, it may be necessary for the FPGAs to be able to 
withstand radiation. FPGAs can be made radiation resistant, a subject that has been 
studied in relation to aviation and space flight (Gaisler, 2002), but in many cases it has 
not been necessary because the I&C cabinets typically reside in areas where the 
radiation is not intense (EPRI, 2009). 
FPGAs using all the three memory technologies, SRAM, flash, and antifuse, have 
been used in NPP safety automation applications (EPRI, 2009). However, since flash 
and antifuse are non-volatile and generally more resistant to disturbances, they may be 
better for safety-critical systems than SRAM that requires special measures to be 
resistant to disturbances (EPRI, 2009).  
The fact that SRAM-based FPGAs are volatile means that they need to be re-
configured each time when powering up. This may cause problems if there is a situation 
where the supply power is cut for a short time and the subsequent re-configuration fails 
for some reason. It may be difficult to verify that the configuration has been successful 
if the application is a passive safety function. 
The flash and antifuse are technologically one or more generations behind the 
CMOS technology that the SRAM-based FPGAs are based on. However, their attributes 
are usually more than adequate for the simple NPP safety automation functions. If 
additional features such as diagnostics and self-testing are implemented, antifuse-based 
FPGAs may not have sufficient capacity (EPRI, 2009). The capacity of flash-based 
FPGAs is constantly improving and is already considered sufficient for these extensive 
functions. Additionally, the larger physical size of the flash-based FPGA device is 
generally not an issue in NPPs unlike e.g. in the mobile phone industry. 
3.5 Comparison with microprocessors 
Because the FPGA technology is mainly seen as a challenger to the microprocessor-
based software technology, this section compares the characteristics of FPGAs to 
microprocessors. An FPGA application is generally less complex than a software 
application since there is no operating system necessary in an FPGA. With software, an 
operating system is needed to switch between different tasks that are executed on the 
CPU. Even the simplest operating system designed specifically for the safety-critical 
features typically contains tens of thousands of lines of code which, laid on top of the 
actual application code, increases the complexity overhead of the system. (EPRI, 2009) 
Although the product of the FPGA design process and the FPGA application is less 
complex than its software counterpart, the design process itself has more phases than 
software design process and is more complex. The FPGA design process is dependent 
on several software tools whereas the software design process typically requires only 
the compiler and linker. 
With an FPGA it is very easy to separate the safety and the support features in an 
application. The CLBs are physically separated and independent of each other, meaning 
that the functions implemented on different CLBs are actually also separated and truly 
independent. 
With software, the execution of the features can also be logically separated within 
the source code. However, in software all features are executed using the same CPU 
meaning that the different features need to share the same resources. This means that the 
features are not completely separated or independent of each other. A multi-core 
microprocessor might help to resolve this since different CPUs could be dedicated for 
specific functions. However, the use of multi-core processors is considered to make the 
software application more complex than when using a single-core processor (Ranta, 
2013). 
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A CPU typically executes one instruction per each clock cycle. Even many simple 
functions consist of tens or hundreds of instructions, and an operating system is needed 
to switch between different functions in an application. When using a single CPU, only 
one task can be executed at a time which may cause concurrency problems such as 
deadlocks or starvation (Bacon, 1998). The CLBs of an FPGA can be independently 
driven by the same clock signal to execute all desired functionality simultaneously 
parallel to each other. 
FPGAs have better performance than microprocessors. It may take several tens or 
hundreds of clock cycles for a microprocessor to complete even a simple function 
whereas functions of almost any size can be executed during a few clock cycles when 
using an FPGA. For a microprocessor it takes time to process each piece of the function 
one by one by running the code line by line whereas an FPGA can execute them in a 
fraction of the time when they are assigned to different CLBs. (EPRI, 2009) 
The lifetime of microprocessors is generally not designed to be decades because the 
development of microprocessors is mainly driven by the consumer market where the 
microprocessors are only used for a few years before they are replaced. Even the 
microprocessors used in industry-oriented programmable logic controllers do not have 
as long lifetimes as is desired. (EPRI, 2009) 
The security issues are considered to be lesser for FPGAs than for software. By 
using a non-re-programmable FPGA or manually preventing the re-programming, the 
configuration can be made permanent. Because the FPGA does not execute code, it is 
considered immune to traditional malicious attacks such as viruses. However, if an 
FPGA is used to emulate a microprocessor, the security issues need to be addressed in 
the same way as when using a normal microprocessor. Although the operational 
security is better with FPGAs, the heavily software tool dependent design process is 
considered more vulnerable to malicious attacks than software development due to the 
need of multiple different tools. 
The need for an FPGA designer to be familiar with the hardware related aspects of 
the technology can be seen as a disadvantage when compared to software. A software 
engineer typically does not need to worry about voltages, pin assignments, and signal 
timings, or to be familiar with electronics netlists or schematic diagrams. Software 
experts are normally easy to find whereas experts in both software and hardware are 
scarcer. However, this is not a big disadvantage in NPP design projects since the 
apparent benefits of using FPGAs instead of microprocessors probably weigh more than 
the convenience of the design process. 
3.6 Examples of FPGA-based systems 
This section contains examples of FPGA-based systems in NPP safety automation. The 
examples are collected from various sources such as conference proceedings and 
technical research reports. 
The first installation of an FPGA-based safety system called the power range 
neutron monitor by Toshiba was done in a Japanese NPP in 2007. A power range 
neutron monitor system receives signals from the neutron flux sensors inside the reactor 
and calculates the overall neutron flux. The system then processes the information and 
provides the necessary signals for the protection system and other systems that use the 
information. (EPRI, 2009) 
The Ukrainian Research and Production Company Radiy is one of the most 
significant developers and manufacturers of FPGA-based I&C platforms for NPPs. One 
of the features of the platform is the engineered safety features and actuation system 
(ESFAS). The ESFAS contains various safety-related functions such as automatic 
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actuation of safeguard equipment and automatic control of actuators according to 
process control algorithms, and manual actuation based on the signals coming from the 
control room. In addition, ESFAS performs such support functions as transmission of 
signals to other systems, and diagnostic, information, and service functions. (EPRI, 
2009) 
In the Temelin NPP in the Czech Republic, the emergency diesel sequencers have 
been implemented using FPGA technology. When the normal power is lost, all the 
devices such as safety systems, valves, and pumps that use power are disconnected from 
the power bus. The diesel generators are then started and the systems that use power are 
sequentially connected to the generators output. The devices cannot be all connected to 
the generator simultaneously because the load spike would be too large. The antifuse-
based FPGAs in the sequencers have now been in operation over ten years without 
problems. (Waage, 2012) 
The Finnish Olkiluoto 3 NPP under construction is planned to have an FPGA-based 
hardwired backup system that is capable of performing some of the key functions of the 
main safety automation system (NRC, 2009a). The FPGA-based system would act as a 
diverse backup to the microprocessor-based primary systems in order to lessen the 
probability of common cause failures related to the microprocessor-based systems 
(NRC, 2010b). 
The French electric utility Électricité de France (EDF) is doing modernisations for 
its NPPs. The aged Motorola MC6800 microprocessors that are currently used in the 
I&C systems need to be replaced but the MC6800 is no longer available on the market. 
Rolls Royce has developed an IP core of the MC6800 for FPGAs. The core is to be 
implemented on FPGAs and used to replace the obsolete microprocessors. (Druilhe, 
2010)  
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4 Case study: Power Limitation System 
A fictional safety automation application called the Power Limitation System (PLS) was 
implemented using actual FPGA devices in this case study. The PLS is a system that 
contains multiple subsystems located on different hardware. Inputs are of different 
priorities and require the outputs of different subsystems. This means that a 
prioritisation is needed between the subsystems to determine the correct output of the 
overall system. In the case study, the whole design process was run through starting 
from writing the requirements specification and ending with a functional two-FPGA 
system. 
The PLS case study is an expansion of a previously conducted case study (Lötjönen, 
2012) where a preventive safety function called the Stepwise Shutdown System (SWS) 
was implemented on an FPGA device. The SWS has previously been used in other 
studies such as a model checking study (Björkman et al., 2009). 
The purpose of the previous FPGA case study was to get hands-on experience on 
designing FPGA applications. Also, it was interesting to see if a known design error in 
the SWS would cause a failure in the FPGA design as it did in the model checking 
study. The FPGA case study proved to be successful, and it was decided that it would 
be expanded as part of this work. 
The main objective of the PLS case study was to get hands-on experience on the 
different V&V methods related to FPGA designs. Two FPGA devices from different 
manufacturers were in order to get experience of the design tools of two different 
manufacturers, and to have a more realistic system through having different functions 
physically separated on different hardware. Communication between the two FPGAs 
was established using a cable to find out what kinds of challenges are related to it. A 
case study with actual FPGAs also further helps illustrate the design and V&V methods 
described in Chapter 2. 
This chapter is organised in five sections. The concept of the PLS is first described 
in Section 4.1. The hardware used in the case study is then described in Section 4.2. The 
design process that was followed through is elaborated in Section 4.3 and the V&V 
process is elaborated in Section 4.4. The case study is then summarised in Section 4.5. 
4.1 System description 
The PLS is a fictional NPP safety automation function that has three operating modes 
and a priority logic to switch between the modes. The system has four binary inputs and 
three binary outputs that are combined as one signal. The concept of the PLS is 
illustrated in Fig. 8. 
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Figure 8: Illustration of the Power Limitation System 
The PLS is confined inside the grey box in Fig. 8, and the interface consists of the 
signal that go in on the top and that come out in bottom of the box. On the top are the 
inputs: Manual, Acceleration, High alarm, and Medium alarm, and on the bottom are 
the outputs PS1, PS2, and PS3 that are combined as one signal, Actuation, after the 
PLS. The signals are combined because they all initiate the actuation in the same way. 
The three outputs are viewed as separate signals only to make the system more 
observable making the testing of the system easier. 
The three modes are implemented as three separate systems: Manual system (MS), 
Automatic system 1 (AS1), and Automatic system 2 (AS2). The three modes are of 
descending priority with the MS being the highest and the AS2 being the lowest. 
Therefore, the Priority system (PS) is needed to determine which of the systems gets to 
drive the Actuation signal based on which inputs are active. 
The only task of the system is to drive an imaginary actuator in three different ways 
according to the current state of the process. The state is indicated by the binary input 
signals High alarm and Medium alarm that are alarms of different severities. The alarm 
signals would be coming from another system (not implemented in this case study) that 
monitors the measurement signals and initiates the appropriate alarms if the 
measurement signals cross certain thresholds. The Manual input is a signal coming from 
the pressing of a button in the control room. Similarly, the Acceleration is also activated 
by the pressing of a button in case the operation of the AS1 needs to be accelerated. 
The three different modes MS, AS1, and AS2 do not communicate with each other 
or affect each other’s functions in any way. They are thus independent of each other and 
are viewed as separate subsystems. The MS simply activates the output whenever the 
input Manual is active. When the input High alarm is activated, the AS1 starts a six-
second operation sequence where the output is first active for two seconds and then 
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inactive for four seconds. This sequence is repeated if the input High alarm is active at 
the end of the cycle. Additional two-second output pulses can be initiated by the input 
Acceleration. The AS2 functions similarly to the AS1 but instead of six seconds, the 
operation sequence is fifteen seconds with first a three-second output pulse and then a 
twelve-second idle period. Additional three-second pulses cannot be initiated in the 
AS2. 
The PS takes in the outputs of the three subsystems and lets the one with the highest 
priority through. For example, if the AS1 and AS2 are both active, only the output of 
the AS1 will get through because it has a higher priority. Similarly, if the MS is active, 
its output always gets through because it has the highest priority. 
4.2 Hardware 
In the case study, two different FPGA devices were used. One was an Altera FPGA and 
the other was the Actel FPGA that was used previously in the SWS case study 
(Lötjönen, 2012). FPGAs by both Actel and Altera have been used in actual NPP safety 
automation applications (NRC, 2009b; EPRI, 2009). Both FPGAs were mounted on 
development kits that are circuit boards with many I/O and other devices that can be 
used with the FPGA. A forty-pin parallel ATA cable, commonly used in optical disk 
drives in regular PCs, was chosen as the interconnecting cable because both 
development kits had an appropriate connector for it. 
Additionally, a serial connection was established between a PC and the Cyclone. 
Through this connection, the outputs of the systems could be properly processed and 
recorded since they would be transmitted to the PC rather than just be indicated by 
blinking light emitting diodes (LEDs) or displays on the development kits. The actual 
hardware setup of the case study is presented in Section 4.3 when the design process is 
elaborated.  
In Fig. 9, the Cyclone FPGA mounted on the development kit is pictured. Those 
devices on the development kit that were used are numbered and explained in the 
following text with a reference to their number. 
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Figure 9: Altera Cyclone II FPGA starter development kit 
In Fig. 9, the Altera Cyclone II SRAM-based FPGA (1) is mounted on the development 
kit with several other devices that could be used with the FPGA. In the development kit, 
there are a lot of devices such as displays, LEDs, switches, audio and video coder-
decoders, several memory chips, a connector for a VGA monitor, and a connector for a 
mouse or a keyboard that can be used for testing many different kinds of applications 
(Altera, 2006). 
The size of the circuit board of the kit is about 160 mm by 160 mm. The full name 
of the FPGA on the kit is Cyclone II EP2C20F484C7N FPGA and its size is about 15 
mm by 15 mm. The FPGA has 18,752 logic elements (LEs) that are Altera’s version of 
CLBs. There are 484 pins in the bottom of the package that the FPGA is in, and 315 of 
these are usable by the developer. (Altera, 2006) 
The configuration of the Cyclone FPGA is done via a USB cable that connects to a 
USB port (2) in the development kit. As the FPGA is SRAM-based, the configuration 
can be done in two ways. The faster way is to directly configure the FPGA through the 
JTAG pins. As the memory elements of the FPGA are volatile, the configuration done 
like this is lost when the power is cut. To cope with this, there is also a dedicated non-
volatile on-board configuration memory (3) for storing the configuration. Using the 
same USB cable, the configuration can be transferred to the configuration memory and 
subsequently each time the FPGA is powered up, it is automatically configured 
according to the contents of the configuration memory. 
The switches (4) and buttons (5) are used to generate the inputs in the PLS case 
study. The outputs can be read from the 7-segment displays (6) and are also transmitted 
to a PC using the serial communication port (7). In the end of the PLS case study, the 
Cyclone FPGA is connected to the other FPGA via a 40-pin parallel cable because both 
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development kits have appropriate connectors (8) for them. The development kit is 
powered by wall-socket power supply that provides 7.5 volts and 0.8 amperes of direct 
current. 
The second FPGA is a flash-based Actel IGLOO FPGA. It is mounted on a 
development kit that, like the Cyclone kit, also has many devices and features of which 
only a small portion is used in the case study. The IGLOO development kit is in Fig. 10. 
 
Figure 10: Actel M1AGL1000 IGLOO FPGA development kit 
The size of the IGLOO development kit circuit board in Fig. 10 is about 100 mm by 100 
mm making it a little smaller than the Cyclone development kit. Similarly to the 
Cyclone development kit, the devices of the IGLOO development kit used in the case 
study are numbered in Fig. 10 and explained in the following text. 
The whole make and model of the FPGA device is Actel M1AGL1000V2-FGG484 
FPGA. It has one million system gates that are organised in 24,576 VersaTiles that are 
Actel’s version of CLBs (Microsemi, 2012a). The capacities of the devices are thus in 
the same region with the IGLOO having a few thousand CLBs more than the Cyclone. 
As the IGLOO is a non-volatile flash-based FPGA, no external configuration memory is 
required. The configuration is done using a USB cable for which there is a connector on 
the development kit (2). The CLBs and wirings of the FPGA are directly configured 
according to the configuration file. 
The I/O devices on the IGLOO development kit are not as abundant as on the 
Cyclone development kit. There are ten small switches (3) and ten red LEDs (4) that 
can be used to generate inputs to and observe the outputs of the system. The IGLOO 
development kit has several forty-pin parallel cable slots of which one (5) was used for 
the communication with the Cyclone. The IGLOO development kit is powered by a 
wall socket power supply that provides five volts and three amperes of direct current. 
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4.3 Design 
This section describes the design process of the PLS. The design process was divided 
into phases and carried out according to Section 2.3 where the design process was 
described. The activities and products that were generated during each phase are 
presented and elaborated in the following text. 
As the case study includes FPGAs of different manufacturers, different software 
tools were used in the development of the applications. For the Cyclone, Altera’s 
Quartus II (Altera, 2011) was used and for the IGLOO, Actel’s Libero integrated design 
environment (IDE) (Actel, 2010) was used. The Quartus II has all of the functions 
needed in different design phases built-in whereas the Libero is only an environment for 
managing the design process and starting different software tools needed in different 
phases. 
 
Requirements specification 
 
The requirements specification was created containing all required features of the PLS. 
The document is divided in roughly two parts: one that contains the non-functional 
requirements and one that contains the functional requirements. 
The non-functional requirements include e.g. a description the operating 
environment, system structure, interface, and other features that do not deal with the 
behaviour of the system directly. In this case, as the system was only intended to be an 
example for trying out the design and V&V methods, the operating environment and the 
interface requirements do not mimic a real-life NPP situation. 
However, regarding the system structure, it was stated in the requirements 
specification that the priority system (PS) shall reside on different hardware than the 
automatic systems. This requirement originates from one of the objectives of the case 
study that was to get two FPGAs communicating with each other. Also, it is quite 
common in real systems that the priority logic is implemented separate and independent 
from the applications such as differently prioritised subsystems that it is communicating 
with. 
Regarding the performance, it was required that an appropriate reaction to an input 
should happen within one millisecond. For the interface, it was required that the outputs 
can be observed via a display and through serial communication, and that all I/O signals 
shall be made fail-safe to achieve some realism. 
In the formulation of the functional requirements, the EARS was used. It was easy 
to formulate the requirements in a way that corresponds to the five EARS requirement 
sentence types presented in Section 2.3. In the following list, some of the requirements 
related to the PLS are laid out: 
 
• When High alarm is activated, AS1 shall perform the six second operation 
sequence. 
• While Medium alarm is inactive, while AS2 is not performing the fifteen-
second operation sequence, AS2 output shall be inactive. 
• While one of the outputs of PS is active, all other outputs of PS shall be 
inactive. 
The first requirement is related to the AS1 and specifies that an activation event in the 
input High alarm shall initiate the basic operation sequence. The second requirement is 
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related to the AS2 and specifies that when the initiating criterion Medium alarm is not 
active and the system is not performing an operation cycle, the output of the system 
shall be inactive.  
 
Architectural design 
 
The architectural design was quite effortless because the required modules were already 
specified in the requirements specification. What was left for the architectural design 
was naming the I/O signals and the modules explicitly in a way that they would 
eventually be named in the VHDL implementation. The modules of the architectural 
design are illustrated in Fig. 11. 
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Figure 11: Architecture diagram of the Power Limitation System 
The I/O signals in Fig. 11 are named as they will be in the following stages of 
development. Although it was specified that all drive the same actuator, the system 
outputs PL_OUT1, PL_OUT2, and PL_OUT3 are combined. This is to make testing 
easier as the different outputs could now be easily observed. 
In the architecture diagram, there are three subsystems instead of the four in the 
original system description in Fig. 8. This is because the manual system (MS) is only a 
direct signal from the input MANUAL to the Priority Logic (PL) due to its trivial 
functionality i.e. because the corresponding output merely follows the value of the 
MANUAL. 
The automatic systems AS1 and AS2 in the system description in Fig. 8 are now 
named Fast Stepwise Shutdown System (FSWS) and Slow Stepwise Shutdown System 
(SSWS), respectively. The names come from the previous case study where a system 
called Stepwise Shutdown System (SWS) was implemented (Lötjönen, 2012). Since the 
functionalities of the FSWS and the SSWS are similar to functionality of the SWS, they 
were named accordingly. 
The PL is named similarly to the original PS and it needed to be designed from 
scratch as the previous case study did not contain a prioritisation logic that could be 
reused in the PLS case study. The next phase was the design of the internal structures of 
the modules in the detailed design phase. 
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Detailed design 
  
In the detailed design phase, the internal structures of the modules in the architectural 
diagram in Fig. 11 were designed. As the FSWS and the SSWS were mere modification 
of the original SWS, designing their logic gate structure was easy. The PL needed to be 
designed from the beginning. The logic circuit diagram of the entire PLS is in Fig. 12. 
The individual modules FSWS, SSWS, and PL in the logic circuit diagram in the figure 
are examined more closely with better pictures later on in this section. Figure 12 is only 
supposed to offer a glance at the complete logic circuit diagram of the PLS.  
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Figure 12: Detailed design diagram of the Power Limitation System 
Apart from the modules, some additional changes have been made into Fig. 12 
compared to the architecture diagram in Fig. 11. The lines above the I/O signals indicate 
that they are ‘active low’ signals. Active low signals are related to making the I/O 
signals fail-safe so that if a line is cut, the system would be activated instead of being 
rendered non-functional. 
Also, there are now six signals going into the PL whereas there are only three 
signals in the architecture diagram. The three additional signals are the ‘enable’ signals 
that are used to convey the inputs MANUAL, ALARM_HIGH, etc. to the PL to help 
determine which system gets to drive the actuator based on which criteria are active. 
The logic circuits of the systems were designed using the standard logic component 
symbols defined in the IEEE Std. 91 (IEEE, 1996). The internal structure of the SSWS 
is in Fig. 13. 
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Figure 13: Detailed design diagram of the Slow Stepwise Shutdown System (SSWS) 
The SSWS has one input, PROCESS_TRIP, whose name originates from the SWS case 
study (Lötjönen, 2012). The PROCESS_TRIP represents the alarm caused by the 
measurement signals crossing their threshold values. The two outputs are OUTPUT and 
PT_OUT. The other output PT_OUT (abbreviated from ‘process trip out’) simply 
follows the value of the PROCESS_TRIP and is thus only used to convey the activating 
criteria to the prioritising system. All I/O signals are active low which is indicated by 
the lines over the signal names. The internal logic however is active high which is why 
there are the inverters INV2 and INV3 near two of the I/O ports. 
The functionality of the SSWS was mostly implemented using standard logic circuit 
symbols for the basic logic blocks such as inverters and AND-blocks. The PULSE 
blocks are not standard logic blocks but instead blocks that implement the functionality 
of a monostable multivibrator circuit that initiates a pulse of a specified length on their 
output when a specified event on their input signal is detected. The pulse-blocks are 
only activated by a rising edge on the input signal and do not react to the input during 
an initiated pulse. In the SSWS, there are three- and fifteen-second pulse blocks. 
From the internal structure of the SSWS the specified behaviour of the SSWS 
emerges in the following way: when the PROCESS_TRIP is activated i.e. its value goes 
from ‘1’ to ‘0’, that signal is first converted into a ‘1’ by the inverter (INV2) and then 
fed to the second input of the first AND-block (AND1). As the system was inactive 
before the activation of the PROCESS_TRIP, the other input of the first AND-block 
(AND1) is ‘1’ for now. 
The output of the AND1 then becomes ‘1’ since both its inputs are ‘1’. As the 
output of the AND1 is also the input of the three-second pulse block (PULSE3), its 
activation then initiates a three-second pulse on the output of the PULSE3. The 
activated output of the PULSE3 is then inverted in INV3 and then assigned to the output 
port OUTPUT. The output of the SSWS is now active and will remain active for three 
seconds since the three-second pulse-block (PULSE3) maintains the pulse for three 
seconds. 
At the same time, the output of the PULSE3 is conveyed to the fifteen-second 
pulse-block (PULSE15). Its output is activated for fifteen seconds, inverted by the 
inverter (INV1) and conveyed to the first input of the AND1. Now, the output of the 
AND1 will be ‘0’ for fifteen seconds regardless of its second output PROCESS_TRIP. 
This means that after the three seconds that the output of the SSWS has been active, a 
twelve-second idle period follows. 
Then, after the fifteen-second sequence, the system becomes responsive to the 
PROCESS_TRIP that can once again have an effect on the output of the AND1. The 
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functionality of the FSWS is very similar to the SSWS with only the added acceleration 
feature and a shorter operation sequence. The logic circuit of the FSWS is in Fig. 14. 
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Figure 14: Detailed design diagram of the Fast Stepwise Shutdown System (FSWS) 
The FSWS has two inputs: PROCESS_TRIP and MANUAL_TRIP. Their names, like 
in the SSWS, originate from the SWS case study. The PROCESS_TRIP is the main 
initiating criterion that works just like in the SSWS. The MANUAL_TRIP represents a 
button in the control room that initiates additional actuation pulses. The outputs of the 
FSWS are OUTPUT and PT_OUT. OUTPUT is the actual output of the system and 
PT_OUT follows the values of the inputs PROCESS_TRIP and MANUAL_TRIP as 
they are both initiating criteria. The PT_OUT is simply used to convey the initiating 
criteria to the prioritisation. The I/O signals of the FSWS are all active low, hence the 
lines over their names. Like in the SSWS, the internal logic is active high which is why 
there are inverters near the I/O ports. 
If the MANUAL_TRIP is untouched, the functionality of the FSWS is very similar 
to the SSWS with only the pulse being two seconds instead of three seconds and the idle 
time being four seconds instead of twelve seconds. The complete sequence of the FSWS 
without the acceleration is thus six seconds instead of the fifteen seconds of the SSWS. 
The MANUAL_TRIP initiates the following functionality: when it is activated i.e. 
its value goes from ‘1’ to ‘0’, it is first inverted by the inverter (INV3) so that the two-
second pulse block (PULSE2_2) gets a rising edge on its input. A two-second pulse is 
initiated and conveyed to both OR-blocks of the system. The OR1 enables the 
MANUAL_TRIP to directly affect the output signal whereas the OR2 enables the 
MANUAL_TRIP to drive the overall logic like the PROCESS_TRIP. The two OR-
gates enable some built-in redundancy of the MANUAL_TRIP functionality.  
The MANUAL_TRIP has a direct effect on the output of the FSWS since the output 
of the PULSE2_2 is conveyed to the OR-block in the end (OR1) whose output then is 
inverted and assigned to the output port of the FSWS. The other input of the OR1 is the 
output of the basic six-second cycle that, if running, is not affected in any way when the 
MANUAL_TRIP is activated. The MANUAL_TRIP thus initiates additional two-
second pulses on top of the basic sequence if the sequence is currently running. Both 
outputs of SSWS and FSWS are connected to the inputs of the PL. The logic circuit 
diagram of the PL is in Fig. 15. 
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Figure 15: Detailed design diagram of the Priority Logic (PL) 
The PL in Fig. 15 has six inputs and three outputs and all of them are active low. The 
inputs IN1, IN2, and IN3 are the ‘payload’ signals i.e. the output signals of the 
subsystems to be prioritised. The inputs EN1, EN2, and EN3 are the ‘enable’ signals 
that are used to determine which of the payload signals gets through to be the output of 
the entire PLS. 
The outputs correspond to the inputs so that the OUT1 is active when the IN1 and 
EN1 are active, the OUT2 is active when IN2 and EN2 are active, and the OUT3 is 
active when the IN3 and EN3 are active. Only one of the outputs OUT1, OUT2, or 
OUT3 can be active at a time. The prioritisation operates so that the highest level signal 
always gets through. For example, when the IN3 and EN3 and thus OUT3 are active, if 
the EN2 becomes active, the IN3 and EN3 no longer have any effect on the OUT3 
because now the IN2 is followed and only OUT2 can be activated. 
The ‘R-latch’ blocks (RL1 and RL2) are memory elements that enable the 
persistence of the previous state of the PL when all signals are inactive. They are 
needed because there may be situations where a subsystem is active but the initiating 
criterion has already become inactive. The requirements state that the operating 
sequence of a system must be completed regardless of the state of the initiating 
criterion. The internal structure of an R-latch is illustrated in Fig. 16. 
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Figure 16: R-latch – An SR-latch whose reset (R) signal has a higher priority than the 
set (S) signal 
The R-latch in Fig. 16 is a modified version of an SR-latch that is a common component 
in digital logic design. The traditional SR-latch lacks the INV1 and AND1 blocks that 
are in the R-latch i.e. it only consists of the NOR1 and NOR2 blocks. It is said that the 
SR-latch should not be used in digital designs due to some shortcomings that cause 
problems (Poiksalo, 2007). Problems arise because in a normal SR-latch, if both inputs 
become active, the logic cannot be resolved deterministically because of the feedback 
between the NOR-gates. In digital logic design, this kind of an issue is called a race 
condition or a metastable condition. Additionally, when multiple SR-latches are used to 
set or reset each other, the timings can cause problems because of the apparent 
concurrent events.  
In the self-made R-latch, these problems have been avoided by adding the 
additional components (INV1 and AND1). The main function of the additional 
components is to implement a higher priority for the reset (R) signal. Additionally, 
when both inputs are active, the logic can be resolved because INV1 and AND1 make 
the set (S) signal to have no effect and the reset gets through. 
Despite the possible shortcomings, the R-latch was used in the design because it is 
simple and there are no components with an equivalent functionality. As there are no 
feedbacks between the R-latches in the PL design, and the problem with both of the 
inputs being active at the same time has been mitigated, the R-latch can be deemed a 
good enough component for the design. 
 
Behavioural description 
 
The behavioural description was done using VHDL. The code was written by hand 
using a regular text editor that supports VHDL syntax. The basic logic blocks such as 
AND-, OR-, and inverter blocks were the same that were used in the Stepwise 
Shutdown System case study (Lötjönen, 2012). The subsystems were put together using 
the basic blocks.  
To enable implementing the systems in different hardware, some modifications 
needed to be made to the detailed design logic circuit diagram. The somewhat 
simplified logic circuit diagram that was eventually implemented in VHDL is in Fig. 17. 
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Figure 17: Final VHDL logic diagram - placement of the systems on different hardware 
The priority logic and the user I/O interface were implemented in the Cyclone FPGA 
and the FSWS and SSWS were implemented in the IGLOO FPGA. Thus, the highest 
level VHDL entities CYCLONE and IGLOO in Fig. 17 are named accordingly and 
reside in the respective FPGAs. Every block in the design gets a clock signal which is 
omitted in the figures to make them clearer. The blocks inside the CYCLONE entity get 
a different clock signal than the ones in the IGLOO because they are from physically 
different sources. A 50 MHz clock is used in the Cyclone development kit and a 48 
MHz clock is used in the IGLOO development kit. 
The design is synchronous which means that on an FPGA, every block receives and 
is activated by the same clock signal. Synchronous design, as opposed to an 
asynchronous design, introduces additional delays that are however minor and do not 
cause violations of the one millisecond response time stated in the requirements. 
Additionally, based on the discussions at the fifth International Workshop on the 
Applications of FPGAs, the FPGA-based NPP safety automation applications should 
always be synchronous. Synchronous design mitigates some of problems found in 
asynchronous design such as glitches and timing issues (Bobrek et al., 2007). 
In Fig. 17, the signals representing the individual wires in the interconnecting cable 
are highlighted. The introduction of the cable imposed some major modifications to the 
system architecture as the PLS needed to be split in two parts due to its separation on to 
different hardware. 
Inside the blue PLS entity of in Fig. 17, the additional I/O ports are in the bottom 
named SSWS_PROCTRIP, FSWS_MANTRIP, FSWS_PROCTRIP, FSWS_OUTPUT, 
FSWS_ENABLE, SSWS_OUTPUT, and SSWS_ENABLE. These are then connected 
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to the I/O ports (GPIO1_N) of the CYCLONE entity. The ports represent the pins of a 
40-pin connector used in the interconnection. Corresponding ports were implemented in 
the IGLOO as well (GPIOA_N). The ports representing the pins in both the CYCLONE 
and the IGLOO are named according to the reference manuals of the devices (Altera, 
2006; Microsemi, 2012c). 
The GPIOA_N-ports are the only ones in the IGLOO entity but there are additional 
ports in the CYCLONE entity. The SW2, SW1 and SW0 correspond to three of the 
switches in Fig. 9, and KEY0 is one of the buttons in the figure. The KEY0 is the 
ACCELERATION, and the switches are MANUAL, ALARM_HIGH, and 
ALARM_MED, respectively. 
The other outputs of the CYCLONE entity have not been elaborated in Fig. 17 and 
are simply regarded as the “Output forming” box in the figure. The output forming 
contains an entity and a few functions for driving the seven-segment screens, blinking 
the green LEDs, and transmitting data through the serial port in Fig. 9. As these are 
simply supporting the observation of the outputs, the details of their implementation are 
not elaborated in Fig.17 to conserve space. 
The design of the system is based on the principle of modularity. Every VHDL 
entity (a block in the design) resides within a separate source code file and they are 
instantiated inside other entities. For example, the CYCLONE VHDL entity contains an 
instance of the PLS entity as well as a few processes and an entity that deal with the 
output forming. Inside the PLS there is an instance of the PL entity that in turn contains 
instances of the basic blocks defined in separate source code files. The highest level 
entities are CYCLONE and IGLOO, and the lowest level entities are the elementary 
logic blocks such as inverters. 
As examples of VHDL, the source code for the IGLOO, SSWS, and a pulse block is 
elaborated next. Similarly to Section 2.3, these will be used as examples in the rest of 
this section when the products of the other design phases are presented. It would not be 
meaningful to elaborate the source code of the entire system as there are thousands of 
lines of code. 
The elaboration of the source code will be conducted from a top-down perspective. 
First, the IGLOO entity is described, and then one of the components, SSWS in 
particular, is described after which one of the blocks, the PULSE block, is described. 
The source code for the IGLOO is presented piecewise below with elaboration between 
different parts. 
 
entity IGLOO is 
   port( CLK     : in  bit; 
         GPIOA_0 : in  bit; -- fsws mantrip 
         GPIOA_1 : out bit; -- ssws output 
         GPIOA_2 : in  bit; -- fsws proctrip 
         GPIOA_3 : out bit; -- ssws enable 
         GPIOA_4 : out bit; -- fsws enable 
         GPIOA_5 : in  bit; -- ssws proctrip 
         GPIOA_6 : out bit); -- fsws output 
end entity; 
 
The first part of the source code of the entity is the entity declaration (Ashenden, 1996). 
In the entity declaration, the name of the entity, the I/O ports, and generic parameters 
are defined. Generic parameters can be used to convey information such as constant 
values when making component instances of an entity. The IGLOO does not have 
generic parameters. The entity declaration is the part that is visible outside of the entity. 
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As the IGLOO VHDL entity represents the IGLOO development kit, the ports 
GPIOA_N are named according to the actual names of the specific pins in the reference 
manual. The green text after the port declarations are VHDL comments showing which 
signals the ports correspond to. A port declaration defines the name and the type of the 
port and whether it is an input or an output port. For example, the CLK is the clock 
signal that is an input of type bit (in  bit). 
 
architecture MAIN of IGLOO is 
 
An architecture is where internal implementation of the entity is defined. An entity can 
have multiple architectures but only one can be synthesised at a time. IGLOO has only 
one architecture MAIN that contains everything that is related to the IGLOO. After this 
line, the declarative part of the architecture begins. In it, the constants, variables, 
components, etc. are declared. 
 
   constant SECOND : integer := 48000000; 
 
The only constant of the IGLOO is the SECOND that is used to convey to the  
FSWS and the SSWS instances the amount of clock cycles needed to spend one second 
of time. As the clock frequency of the IGLOO development kit is 48 MHz, it takes 
48,000,000 clock cycles to spend one second. 
 
   component FSWS is 
      generic( SECOND : integer); 
      port( CLK          : in bit; -- clock signal 
            PROCESS_TRIP : in bit; -- active low 
            MANUAL_TRIP  : in bit; -- active low 
            OUTPUT       : out bit; -- actuation 
            PT_OUT       : out bit); -- conveys the pt 
   end component; 
 
   component SSWS is 
      generic( SECOND : integer); 
      port( CLK          : in bit; 
            PROCESS_TRIP : in bit; 
            OUTPUT       : out bit; 
            PT_OUT       : out bit); 
   end component; 
    
The FSWS and the SSWS are used in the IGLOO as components. First they are declared 
and then later on instantiated. A component declaration looks very similar to an entity 
declaration as the same information is given in it. The implementation of the 
components need not be defined if they have already been defined in a separate source 
code file. The compilers can automatically find them if they are named the same way in 
the component declaration and in the original entity declaration.  
 
begin 
 
      FSWS_C : component FSWS 
      generic map( SECOND => SECOND ) 
      port map( CLK => CLK, 
                PROCESS_TRIP => GPIOA_2, 
                MANUAL_TRIP => GPIOA_0, 
                OUTPUT => GPIOA_6, 
                PT_OUT => GPIOA_4); 
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   SSWS_C : component SSWS 
      generic map( SECOND => SECOND ) 
      port map( CLK => CLK, 
                PROCESS_TRIP => GPIOA_5, 
                OUTPUT => GPIOA_1, 
                PT_OUT => GPIOA_3); 
 
end architecture; 
 
After the “begin”, the declarative part of the architecture ends and the actual 
behaviour or structure of the architecture is defined. The architecture of the IGLOO is a 
structural architecture since it does not define any sequential behaviour but instead just 
the structure of the entity IGLOO. In a structural architecture, the behaviour becomes 
implicitly defined through the components and their interconnections. 
The architecture consists only of the instantiations of the two components FSWS_C 
and SSWS_C. The ‘C’-suffix stands for “component”. The I/O ports of the IGLOO 
entity are connected to the corresponding I/O ports of the component instances by using 
the “port map” statement. The constant SECOND is also conveyed to the instances 
through the “generic map” statement. The left side of a mapping is the name of the 
port of the instantiated entity and the right side, after the “=>”, is the signal or port that 
is assigned to the port of the instantiated entity. The source code for the entity ends in 
the “end architecture” statement. 
As the IGLOO entity is only used to wrap together the FSWS and SSWS and to 
provide an interface between the actual devices on the development kit and the VHDL 
constructs, it is very simple. The complexity lies within the instantiated components. 
The source code for the SSWS is piecewise presented below with elaboration between 
the parts. 
 
entity SSWS is 
   generic( SECOND : integer ); 
   port( CLK          : in bit; 
         PROCESS_TRIP : in bit; 
         OUTPUT       : out bit; 
         PT_OUT       : out bit); 
end entity; 
 
First, there is the entity declaration of the SSWS. In the SSWS, there are four I/O ports: 
CLK, PROCESS_TRIP, OUTPUT, and PT_OUT. The type of the ports is specified and 
whether a port is an input or an output port. For example, PROCESS_TRIP is defined 
as an input that is of type bit (in bit). 
The SSWS also has one generic parameter SECOND. It is used when the SSWS is 
instantiated to specify the amount of clock cycles it takes to spend one second of time. 
Since the SSWS is implemented in the IGLOO development kit that has a 48 MHz 
clock, the value of the SECOND is 48,000,000. The generic parameter enables the use of 
the SSWS in other devices with a different clock frequency as well. 
 
architecture MAIN of SSWS is 
 
   signal AND1_OUT    : bit; 
   signal INV1_OUT    : bit; 
   signal INV2_OUT    : bit; 
   signal INV3_OUT    : bit; 
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   signal PULSE15_OUT : bit; 
   signal PULSE3_OUT  : bit; 
 
Signals in VHDL can be used to transmit information between instances of different 
components or to convey information to and from the I/O ports. The signals correspond 
to the lines between the blocks in the entities e.g. in Fig. 17. Signals are essential when 
building a system out of interconnected blocks as the interconnections are implemented 
using the signals. The signals of the SSWS entity correspond to the “wires” between the 
blocks in the SSWS logic circuit diagram in Fig. 13. 
 
   component PULSE is 
      generic( PULSE_LENGTH : integer; 
               SECOND       : integer); 
      port( CLK    : in  bit; 
            INPUT  : in  bit; 
            OUTPUT : out bit); 
   end component; 
 
 
   component AND2GATE is 
      port( CLK    : in  bit; 
            INPUT1 : in  bit; 
            INPUT2 : in  bit; 
            OUTPUT : out bit); 
   end component; 
 
 
   component INVERTER is 
      port( CLK    : in bit; 
            INPUT  : in bit; 
            OUTPUT : out bit); 
   end component; 
 
The SSWS architecture, like the IGLOO architecture, is also a structural architecture. 
There are three components: PULSE, AND2GATE, and INVERTER. The PULSE block 
acts as a monostable multivibrator: it outputs a pulse of a fixed length in case of a 
specific event. In this case, the event is a rising edge in the input signal. Components 
that only respond to rising or falling edges of an input signal are called edge-sensitive 
and they are common in digital design (Poiksalo, 2007).  
The desired length of the pulse is conveyed to the PULSE block using a generic 
parameter. The amount of clock cycles needed to spend one second is also given as a 
generic parameter. The I/O ports are simply the CLK, INPUT, and OUTPUT. A rising 
edge on the INPUT initiates the fixed-length pulse on the OUTPUT. The component 
declarations of the AND2GATE and the INVERTER are also quite straightforward: clock 
signal, and inputs and outputs. 
 
begin 
   PT_OUT <= PROCESS_TRIP; 
 
The second output PT_OUT is only used to convey the input PROCESS_TRIP to the 
PL, so the value of the PROCESS_TRIP is assigned to the PT_OUT before the 
component instantiations. 
 
   PULSE15 : component PULSE 
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      generic map( PULSE_LENGTH => 15, 
                   SECOND => SECOND) 
      port map( CLK    => CLK, 
                INPUT  => PULSE3_OUT, 
                OUTPUT => PULSE15_OUT); 
                 
   PULSE3 : component PULSE 
      generic map( PULSE_LENGTH => 3, 
                   SECOND => SECOND) 
      port map( CLK    => CLK, 
                INPUT  => AND1_OUT, 
                OUTPUT => PULSE3_OUT); 
 
   INV1 : component INVERTER 
      port map( CLK    => CLK, 
                INPUT  => PULSE15_OUT, 
                OUTPUT => INV1_OUT); 
 
   INV2 : component INVERTER 
      port map( CLK    => CLK, 
                INPUT  => PROCESS_TRIP, 
                OUTPUT => INV2_OUT); 
 
   INV3 : component INVERTER 
      port map( CLK    => CLK, 
                INPUT  => PULSE3_OUT, 
                OUTPUT => OUTPUT); -- the system output assigned here 
 
   AND1 : component AND2GATE 
      port map( CLK    => CLK, 
                INPUT1 => INV1_OUT, 
                INPUT2 => INV2_OUT, 
                OUTPUT => AND1_OUT); 
 
end architecture; 
 
The instantiation of the components is similar to the IGLOO entity, there are just more 
components in the SSWS. The PULSE blocks of two different lengths are instances of 
the same PULSE component but with a different value in the generic parameter that is 
used to define the length of the pulse. The source code for the entity ends in the “end 
architecture” statement. 
The source code for the PULSE block is piecewise presented below with added 
elaboration between the parts. The PULSE block is the most complex block used in the 
design because it involves dealing with time for which there are no ready-made timer 
applications that are present e.g. in most microcontrollers. The time needs to be spent by 
incrementing an integer counter each clock cycle and comparing its value to some 
constant representing e.g. the amount of clock cycles needed to spend one second. 
 
entity PULSE is 
   generic( PULSE_LENGTH : integer ; 
            SECOND       : integer ); 
   port(CLK    : in  bit ; 
        INPUT  : in  bit ; 
        OUTPUT : out bit ); 
end entity; 
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The entity declaration is similar to the previous ones presented. There are two generic 
parameters and three I/O ports. The PULSE_LENGTH is used to specify the length of 
the pulse in seconds, and the SECOND is the amount of clock cycles needed to spend 
one second. The OUTPUT is activated for PULSE_LENGTH seconds when there is a 
rising edge on the INPUT. 
 
architecture BEHAVIORAL of PULSE is 
   signal   RESULT      : bit; 
 
The PULSE has one architecture and, unlike the previous ones, it is a behavioural 
architecture. This means that the architecture describes behaviour e.g. through 
sequential or concurrent operations rather than defining a structure through instantiating 
components. The signal RESULT is used to temporarily store the value of the output 
before assigning it to the output port. The reason for this will be elaborated later on. 
 
begin 
 
   process ( CLK, INPUT ) is 
      variable COUNTER    : integer := 0; 
      variable PULSE_ON   : bit; 
      variable PREV_INPUT : bit; 
 
The architecture contains one process that is used in VHDL when sequential operations 
are needed. The statements and operations inside a process are executed in a sequential 
order like in normal software programmes. To spend time, sequential operations are 
necessary. After the word “process”, there are brackets inside which are the inputs 
CLK and INPUT. This is called a sensitivity list and it is used to define which signals 
cause the process to be executed. Now, whenever there is activity in either the CLK or 
the INPUT, the process is executed. 
Like an architecture, a process also has a declarative part. The variables defined in 
the declarative part of this process are supporting the functionality of the block. The 
COUNTER is incremented each clock cycle to keep track of how many clock cycles have 
elapsed i.e. how much time has passed. The PULSE_ON is a flag used as an indicator 
when the pulse is on-going. The PREV_INPUT is used to store the value of the INPUT 
at the end of each process cycle. The value is then used on the next process cycle to 
determine if there is a rising edge on the INPUT. This will be elaborated later on. 
 
   begin 
 
      if CLK'event and CLK = '1' then 
 
The very first thing that is checked each time the process is executed is whether there is 
a rising edge on the clock signal CLK. This is also done in every other block such as the 
AND2GATE or OR2GATE that has a process. The check makes the design synchronous 
as the rest of the statements in the processes are only executed when there is a rising 
edge on the clock signal. 
  
         -- if current input is greater than the previous one,  
         -- there's a rising edge which initializes the pulse 
         if INPUT > PREV_INPUT then 
            PULSE_ON := '1'; 
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Now, the previously declared PREV_INPUT variable is used to check if there is a 
rising edge on the input signal INPUT. This is done by simply checking if the current 
value is greater than the previous value. Also, if there is a rising edge, the flag 
PULSE_ON is set to ‘true’ to indicate that the pulse is considered to be on from this 
point on. 
 
            -- pulse is kept on for the duration of the pulse 
            if COUNTER < PULSE_LENGTH*SECOND then 
               RESULT <= '1'; 
               COUNTER := COUNTER + 1; 
             
            -- when time runs out, the pulse ends 
            else 
               RESULT <= '0'; 
               PULSE_ON := '0'; 
               COUNTER := 0; 
            end if; 
       
If a rising edge was detected on the input, the current value of the counter is compared 
to the fixed value that indicates the time. As an example of a value that the counter is 
compared to, if the desired length of the pulse is two seconds and the clock frequency is 
48 MHz, the value of the PULSE_LENGTH*SECOND expression would be 
2*48,000,000 that is evaluated as 96,000,000. 
If the counter has not yet reached the limit i.e. the if-statement is evaluated as true, 
a ‘1’ is assigned to the temporary value of the output and the counter is incremented by 
one. The temporary value is needed because the ports cannot be directly manipulated 
inside a process. 
If the counter has reached the limit i.e. the if-statement evaluates false, it means 
that the pulse has been on for the desired time. Subsequently, a ‘0’ is assigned to the 
temporary value RESULT of the output, the PULSE_ON is turned to ‘0’ to indicate that 
the pulse is not supposed to be on anymore, and the counter is reset. 
 
         -- if there is no rising edge but there is still time,  
         -- pulse is continued 
         elsif COUNTER < PULSE_LENGTH*SECOND and PULSE_ON = '1' then 
            RESULT <= '1'; 
            COUNTER := COUNTER + 1; 
         else 
            RESULT <= '0'; 
            PULSE_ON := '0'; 
            COUNTER := 0; 
         end if; 
       
The elsif-statement corresponds to the if-statement where the rising edge of the 
input was checked. As the rising edge only initiates the pulse, most of the time there is 
no rising edge detected but the pulse still needs to be output. 
The condition inside the elsif-statement is similar to the one in the preceding if-
statement with the added PULSE_ON = '1' check. If the pulse has previously been 
initiated by a rising edge, the flag has also been turned to ‘1’. Thus, if the counter has 
not reached the limit, and the flag has been turned, a ‘1’ is assigned to the temporary 
value of the output and the counter is incremented. 
If either the counter reaches the limit or the pulse has not been initialised i.e. the 
PULSE_ON is ‘0’, the pulse has been completed or does not need to be output due to it 
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not having even been initialised. Then, a ‘0’ is assigned to the temporary value RESULT 
of the output, the flag PULSE_ON is turned to ‘0’, and the counter is reset. 
 
PREV_INPUT := INPUT; -- previous input saved for the next clk 
cycle 
       
      end if; -- clk if 
   end process; 
    
   -- after each clk cycle, the result is assigned to the output port 
   OUTPUT <= RESULT; 
 
end architecture; 
 
The last statement of the process is the storing of the value of the current input to the 
variable PREV_INPUT. The value is then available in the next process cycle. After the 
process, the value of RESULT is assigned to the output port OUTPUT. As this happens 
outside of the process, it is done concurrently. 
This is a fundamental difference between traditional software run on a CPU and a 
VHDL application run on an FPGA. When using an FPGA, there can be hundreds or 
thousands of concurrent commands that are actually executed concurrently whereas 
when using a microprocessor, the commands are executed sequentially one after the 
other. In the VHDL code above, the value of the OUTPUT is updated concurrently but 
the value of the RESULT is updated only at specified times inside the sequential 
process. 
The serial transmission was implemented by creating a VHDL entity that transmits 
the seven I/O signals of the PLS inside a byte. The speed of the transmission is 9600 
bauds i.e. the entity sends 9600 bits per second. The individual bits inside each byte 
contain the current values of the I/O signals. 
The Simulink extension of Matlab is used to read and process the bytes sent by the 
Cyclone development kit. In order to get the individual bits from the bytes, the bytes 
first needs to be converted into an eight character binary numbers of 1s and 0s. After 
that, the binary numbers are converted into strings and exported into an external file. 
The files can then be opened and inspected e.g. using Microsoft Excel (Microsoft, 
2013). This is demonstrated in Section 4.4 when the integration V&V phase is 
described. 
As there are only seven signals, the eighth bit in the byte is redundant. It is 
constantly kept as ‘1’ to indicate that data is actually being transmitted. If the bit at any 
time goes to ‘0’, it is an indication that something is wrong with the transmission or 
reception. The rest of the blocks were implemented in the same way as the ones 
described above. After the VHDL code of the design blocks was complete, the next step 
was synthesis where the code was be compiled into a gate-level model and a netlist. 
 
Synthesis 
 
As the FPGAs used in the case study were of different manufacturers, different software 
tools were used for the FPGAs in synthesis. Altera’s Quartus II was used when 
designing the systems for the Cyclone and it has the synthesis tool built-in whereas 
Actel’s Libero IDE is a collection of third party software tools. Thus, for the IGLOO 
synthesis, a software tool called Synplify Pro by Synopsys included in the Libero IDE 
was used. 
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When synthesising the systems, manual corrections were not necessary. The systems 
have no redundancy that could be interpreted obsolete by the synthesis tools and thus 
omitted. The gate-level schematic diagram of the CYCLONE VHDL entity generated 
by the Quartus II synthesis tool is in Fig. 18.  
 
Figure 18: Gate-level schematic diagram of the CYCLONE VHDL entity generated by 
the Altera Quartus II software tool 
The input ports are on the left and the output ports are on the right in Fig. 18. The 
outputs were regarded as the “Output forming” block in Fig. 17 and they include ports 
for driving the seven-segment screens on the Cyclone development kit (SEG7_N[N]), 
and the signal going to the serial port (SERIAL_OUT). There is also an input port 
called SERIAL_ENABLE that was not in Fig. 17. That is merely used for enabling or 
disabling the serial transmission when needed. 
In Fig. 18, there are the familiar I/O ports SW2, SW1, SW0, KEY0, and the cable 
outputs GPIO1_N. The ‘PLS:PLS_INSTANCE’ and ‘SERIAL:SERIAL_INSTANCE’ 
boxes are components and the ‘DISP0_TEMP~4N’ boxes are related to a process 
dealing with driving the seven-segment displays. The schematic diagram of the IGLOO 
VHDL entity generated by the Synplify Pro software tool is in Fig. 19. 
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Figure 19:  Gate-level schematic diagram of the IGLOO VHDL entity generated by the 
Synplify Pro software tool 
The IGLOO contains the two component instances of the entities FSWS and SSWS that 
are visible as the yellow boxes in Fig. 19. The I/O ports are also visible and there are no 
additional ports to the ones in Fig. 17. The grey boxes labelled ‘INBUF’, ‘OUTBUF’, 
and ‘CLKBUF’ are buffers related to the I/O ports.  
Any of the blocks in Fig. 19 can be opened up in the tool to show the contents of the 
block. The SSWS and one of its components (the PULSE block) are used as an example 
of the output products of different phases in this section. Therefore, the contents of the 
yellow SSWS box in Fig. 19 are presented in more detail in Fig. 20. 
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Figure 20: Gate-level schematic diagram of the SSWS VHDL entity generated by the 
Synplify software tool 
The schematic diagram in Fig. 20 looks quite familiar when compared to the detailed 
design logic circuit diagram in Fig. 13. The shape of the blocks in the schematic 
diagram is not as distinctive as in the detailed design diagram but the functions of the 
blocks can be inferred from their names.  
It was expected that the diagrams would be similar because the VHDL description 
was based on a ready-made logic circuit. Had the VHDL code been written based on a 
functional description instead of a ready-made structure, the synthesis tool would have 
created a logic circuit design that would have probably looked quite different. 
Again, each of the yellow component instances of the entities in Fig. 20 could be 
opened in the tool and their contents viewed. The schematic diagram of the PULSE 
block is inspected next. It is not based on a ready-made logic circuit but instead on a 
functional description of a monostable multivibrator. A small part of the schematic 
diagram of the three-second pulse block labelled ‘PULSE_3_48000000’ in Fig. 20 is 
opened up in Fig. 21. 
60 
 
 
Figure 21: Small part of the gate-level schematic diagram of the three-second pulse 
VHDL entity in the SSWS generated by the Synplify software tool 
The schematic diagram in Fig. 21 looks even more confusing than the previous ones. 
This is mainly because the actual implementation is now at actual the gate-level. There 
are a lot of d-flip-flops (DFN1) to implement the integer counter that is used in the 
pulse. There are also other basic components such as combinatorial logic gates (OR3C, 
NOR2A). Only seven of the fifty blocks overall in the gate-level schematic diagram are 
visible in Fig. 21. 
 
Place and route (PAR) 
 
Like synthesis, the PAR was done using different software tools. The PAR for the 
Cyclone was performed using the built-in tool in the Quartus II whereas the PAR for the 
IGLOO was done using Actel’s Designer software tool included in the Libero IDE. In 
the PAR, the I/O ports of the design blocks were assigned to specific pins of the 
development kits. The reference manuals of the development kits contain information 
about which devices are connected to which pins. The software tools have an interface 
for easily assigning the pins. 
One of the products of the PAR is the configuration file. Two configuration files 
were generated for the Cyclone FPGA: one for direct JTAG configuration and one for 
configuring the non-volatile configuration memory on the Cyclone development kit. For 
the flash-based IGLOO, only one configuration file was generated. 
The information in the configuration files is binary i.e. at the lowest possible 
abstraction level. Such information is difficult to interpret manually without special 
expertise. A small part of the JTAG configuration file containing the configuration for 
the CYCLONE entity for the Cyclone FPGA is in Fig. 22. The configuration file was 
examined using the Frhed free hex editor (Frhed, 2009). 
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Figure 22: Part of the JTAG configuration file of the CYCLONE entity for the Cyclone 
FPGA 
There are 486,568 bytes in total in the JTAG configuration file, and only the first 580 
bytes are shown in Fig. 22. The configuration files used to configure the IGLOO FPGA 
and the non-volatile configuration memory on the Cyclone development kit are larger 
and seem more complex than the JTAG configuration file. 
The other product of the PAR is the model of the physical layout of the design on 
the FPGA. All of the CLBs and I/O pins of the FPGA chip are visible in the software 
tools. A general view of the physical layout model of the CYCLONE design on the 
Cyclone FPGA is in Fig. 23. 
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Figure 23: Model of the CYCLONE design mapped into the Cyclone FPGA with the 
added red rectangle whose contents are elaborated in Fig. 24 
Many details cannot be seen in Fig. 23. However, the utilisation of the FPGA resources 
can be seen. The small blue rectangles represent the CLBs and the brown blocks on the 
edges represent the I/O blocks. The utilisation of a block is indicated by how dark its 
colour is: the darker the block, the more of the resources of the CLB are utilised. The 
black section on the left does not contain CLBs. 
Now, only a very small amount of the blocks are used since the design is relatively 
simple. The individual CLBs can be inspected by zooming in on the model. In Fig. 23, 
two of the CLBs are surrounded by a red circle. When zoomed in, these CLBs become 
more detailed as can be seen in Fig. 24. 
(See Fig. 24) 
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Figure 24: The utilisation of the resources of two CLBs in the physical layout model of 
the Cyclone 
The orange-red-coloured blocks in Fig. 24 are the utilised resources of the CLB and the 
white blocks are unutilised. In the CLB on the left, in the resources where the orange 
and red part are both utilised, information such as temporary results of inverters and 
other combinatorial logic blocks are stored. In the two resources with only the orange 
part utilised, temporary results related to one of the seven-segment displays are stored. 
All of the resources of the CLB on the right are utilised. 
The model of the physical model of the IGLOO design on the IGLOO FPGA is 
similar to the Cyclone. The CLBs are portrayed a little differently since the PAR is done 
using a different software tool. Half of the model of the physical layout of the IGLOO is 
in Fig. 25. 
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Figure 25: Half of the model of the physical layout of the IGLOO design on the IGLOO 
FPGA. 
Only half of the physical layout model is pictured in Fig. 25. Actually, the model 
continues to the right but as the other half is empty (CLBs unutilised), and the whole 
picture would be too wide to fit on a page, only the left half is included here. 
The small black squares filling the sixteen visible centre regions in Fig. 25 represent 
the CLBs and the squares on the edges represent the I/O pins. Utilised blocks are again 
coloured differently. The utilised CLBs are lighter than the unutilised meaning that most 
of the CLBs are unutilised in the IGLOO FPGA like in the Cyclone. 
The pulse blocks in the FSWS and SSWS are responsible for utilising most of the 
CLBs in the design. In most blocks, operations are only done using binary valued data 
but in the pulse blocks, there are the large integer counters that are used to spend time. 
Operating with integers requires a lot more memory capacity than operating with binary 
data. 
 
Configuration 
 
In configuration, the configuration files generated in the PAR were used to configure 
the FPGAs. The Cyclone has two configuration methods: JTAG and Active Serial 
(Altera, 2006). Both of these are done using a USB-cable between a PC and the 
development kit. JTAG is simply the direct configuration of the FPGA through the 
JTAG pins. Active Serial configuration is the transfer of the configuration file to the 
external non-volatile configuration memory on the Cyclone development kit in Fig. 9. 
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Whenever the development kit is powered up, the FPGA is automatically configured 
through the JTAG pins using the stored configuration bit stream file. 
The IGLOO is also configured through the JTAG pins (Microsemi, 2012a). The 
configuration was done using Actel’s FlashPro software tool included in the Libero 
IDE. As the flash-based switchboxes themselves are non-volatile, no external memory 
is needed to store the configuration when the power is cut. The configuration of the 
IGLOO is also done using a USB-cable between the PC and the IGLOO development 
kit. 
 
Integration 
 
In integration, the FPGAs were connected together after being individually configured. 
This was done by connecting a forty-pin parallel cable to the appropriate connectors on 
each development kit. The assignment of the signals to the wires of the cable is 
illustrated in Fig. 26. 
Connector
SSWS_OUTPUT
SSWS_ENABLE
SSWS_PROCTRIP
FSWS_MAN_TRIP
FSWS_PROCTRIP
FSWS_ENABLE
FSWS_OUTPUT
 
Figure 26: Signals in the interconnection cable 
The top part of the forty-pin cable/connector is illustrated in Fig. 26. The signals 
corresponding to those in Fig. 17 are assigned to specific pins and thus separate wires in 
the parallel cable. A standard serial cable was also connected to the Cyclone 
development kit in order to enable the transmission of the I/O signals to a PC. The 
complete FPGA installation is in Fig. 27. 
66 
 
 
Figure 27: The Cyclone (left) and IGLOO FPGA development kits connected together, 
powered up, and running the PLS 
As the system was not intended to be installed in a realistic environment, the connection 
of the cable constituted the whole integration design phase which then completed the 
development process. Thus, the installation in Fig. 27 is the final product of the whole 
design process. 
4.4 Verification and Validation 
The V&V process was followed through similarly to the design process. As mentioned 
earlier, the aim was not to comprehensively show that the PLS is error-free but instead 
to try out the different methods described in Section 2.4 and to see what kinds of 
evidence they could provide of the correctness of the system. The purpose was to get an 
impression of what are the challenges and limitations related to the utilisation of the 
methods and are they easily applicable to actual systems. In the following text, the 
activities performed and challenges faced in different phases of the V&V process are 
described. 
 
Requirements V&V 
 
The requirements V&V consisted of a requirements review. The requirements 
specification document was reviewed by several people and, based on the comments of 
the reviewers, several changes were made and some errors found. Some of the changes 
are described in the following text. 
A few of the requirements were in conflict with each other. One of the original 
requirements was “While Acceleration is inactive, AS1 enable shall be deactivated”. 
The AS1 enable is supposed to be active when either of the inputs High alarm or 
Acceleration is active. However, the requirement stated that whenever the Acceleration 
is deactivated, the AS1 enable should also be deactivated even though the High alarm 
could be active and thus the AS1 enable should not be deactivated. 
The requirement was changed to "While High alarm and Acceleration are inactive, 
AS1 enable shall be inactive”. Now it is required that both inputs are inactive in order 
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for the AS1 enable to also be made inactive. The independent reviewers had an 
objective viewpoint on the requirements, and thus other changes that were made were 
mainly clarifications and making the requirements less ambiguous to an independent 
reader. 
 
Architecture V&V 
 
The architecture V&V consisted only of an architecture review. Simulation was not 
done because it would have required additional effort to develop the modules in a way 
that would have enabled simulation. Because the key logic circuit diagrams were 
already partially known (modifications of the SWS), the additional effort in coming up 
with an architecture that could be simulated would have been in vain. It was much more 
feasible to simulate the subsequent detailed design logic circuits. 
The architecture review was iterative. There were six different versions of the 
architecture before the final one emerged. Each of the versions had the same three 
subsystems that were in the final version but they were organised differently and the 
enable-signals were also implemented a little differently. The major changes originated 
from the need to make the system more realistic. 
For example, originally the priority system was located before the other subsystems 
so that it would activate the systems instead of the inputs activating them directly. The 
priority logic was then moved to the other side, after the other systems and closer to the 
actuator, because one of the reviewers said that the priority logic is typically 
implemented that way in real systems. 
 
Detailed design V&V 
 
A review was also conducted during detailed design V&V. In the review, the logic 
circuit diagrams were inspected. The review did not reveal any errors in the structure. 
However, errors are difficult to find in logic circuit diagrams by simply looking at them. 
Other V&V was still required to deem the circuits correct. 
The logic circuit diagrams were also simulated because they were implemented 
using standard logic blocks. The software tool used for the simulation was the Simulink 
extension of Matlab by Mathworks (Mathworks, 2012). Simulink supports the 
simulation of the standard logic blocks and even has a wide variety of ready-made 
blocks that could be used. A model of the PLS was constructed using the blocks found 
in Simulink and is illustrated in Fig. 28. 
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Figure 28: Simulink-model of the Power Limitation System (PLS) 
The design in Fig. 28 looks similar to the architecture diagram in Fig. 11. The 
subsystems were implemented using the ‘Subsystem’-blocks in Simulink. The input 
signals were generated using the ‘Step’-block. The model could be easily modified to 
accept external inputs but as the test cases were scarce and simple, it was easier to use 
the Step-block. The output signals were exported to the Matlab workspace by using the 
‘To workspace’-blocks. In Fig. 29, the contents of the FSWS subsystem are illustrated. 
 
Figure 29: Simulink model of the Fast Stepwise Shutdown System (FSWS) 
The diagram in Fig. 29 is similar to the detailed design logic circuit diagram of the 
FSWS illustrated in Fig. 14. The basic blocks such as the inverters, the AND-, and the 
OR-blocks are the same as in Fig. 14 but two other changes were made. 
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First, the pulse blocks were replaced by the ‘Monostable’-blocks found in Simulink. 
The Monostable-block implements the functionality of a monostable multivibrator 
which is exactly how the pulse blocks are supposed to work. Additionally, because the 
feedback from the output of the PULSE2_1 to the input of the PULSE6 caused an 
algebraic loop that Simulink could not solve as such, some delay was added to the 
feedback loop by using the ‘Unit Delay’-blocks of Simulink. 
The other subsystems were implemented in the same way. The SSWS was very 
similar to the FSWS and the PL was constructed using the basic blocks. The R-latches 
that were used as the memory elements in the PL were also implemented using the 
‘Subsystem’-block. 
The amount of test cases was small because the purpose was only to try out 
different methods. The same test cases were used in the subsequent V&V phases and 
they were such that they could be used during the hardware tests as well i.e. they could 
be easily tested using the switches and the buttons on the Cyclone development kit. 
The simulations were done ‘bottom-up’ i.e. first the subsystems were simulated 
individually and then the whole PLS was simulated. The individual blocks were not 
tested because they were provided by Matlab and thus needed no testing. Test cases 
were devised for each of the subsystems as well as the whole system. The test cases for 
the SSWS were: 
1. PROCESS_TRIP is activated after 1 second 
2. PROCESS_TRIP is activated after 1 second and deactivated after 2 seconds 
3. PROCESS_TRIP is activated after 1 second and deactivated after 2 seconds, 
PROCESS_TRIP is activated after 8 seconds and deactivated after 9 seconds 
The test cases verify the key features of the SSWS specified in the requirements 
specification. The temporal properties in the test cases refer to the absolute time after 
the start of the simulation. The results of test case 1 of the SSWS are illustrated in Fig. 
30. The simulation was run for thirty seconds. 
 
Figure 30: Results of the detailed design simulation of the test case 1 of the SSWS in 
Simulink 
In Fig. 30, the three I/O signals of the SSWS are illustrated. The thirty-second run time 
is indicated by the x-axis in the figure. After one second, the active-low process trip is 
activated which initiates the fifteen-second sequence. Based on the simulations, the 
behaviour of the SSWS was deemed correct. After the simulations of the SSWS, the 
FSWS was simulated. The test cases were quite similar to the SSWS test cases. 
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However, the additional input MANUAL_TRIP increases the number of test cases. The 
test cases for the FSWS were: 
1. PROCESS_TRIP is activated after 1 second 
2. MANUAL_TRIP is activated after 1 second 
3. PROCESS_TRIP is activated after 1 second and deactivated after 2 seconds 
4. PROCESS_TRIP is activated after 1 second and deactivated after 2 seconds, 
PROCESS_TRIP is activated after 4 seconds and deactivated after 5 seconds 
5. PROCESS_TRIP is activated after 1 second, MANUAL_TRIP is activated after 
10 seconds and deactivated after 11 seconds 
The FSWS test cases cover the key features that were required in the requirements 
specification. The design was simulated in Simulink and the results of test case 5 are 
illustrated in Fig. 31. 
 
Figure 31: Results of the detailed design simulation of the test case 5 of the FSWS in 
Simulink 
The I/O signals are illustrated now with the additional MANUAL_TRIP input in Fig. 
31. The FSWS was also simulated for thirty seconds. Now, the PROCESS_TRIP is 
again activated after one second which initiates the six second operation sequence. After 
ten seconds, the MANUAL_TRIP is activated for one second, which initiates an 
additional two-second pulse in between the pulses of the basic sequence. The operation 
then continues normally, and overall the design seems to behave correctly. 
The PL has more inputs but no temporal properties unlike the SSWS and FSWS. 
The required responses to all the different input combinations were specified in the 
requirements specification; there are sixty-four different ways that the six inputs can be 
combined. On a purely combinational design such as the PL, all input combinations 
could easily be tested. However, in this case study only a few of the key features were 
tested. The test cases for the PL are: 
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1. IN1 and EN1 active 
2. IN2 and EN2 active 
3. IN3 and EN3 active 
4. IN1 active 
5. EN1 active 
6. IN2 active 
7. EN2 active 
8. IN3 active 
9. EN3 active 
10. IN1 and EN1 active, and IN2 and EN2 active 
11. IN2 and EN2 active, and IN3 and EN3 active 
12. IN1 and EN1 active, and IN3 and EN3 active 
Since there are no temporal properties i.e. no long pulses or any other time-related 
functionality, multiple test cases could easily be simulated successively. In Fig. 32, the 
results of the simulation of the test cases 3 and 1 of the PL are illustrated respectively. 
 
Figure 32: Results of the successive detailed design simulations of the test cases 3 and 1 
of the PL in Simulink 
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In Fig. 32, all nine I/O signals of the PL are illustrated. Unlike the previous simulations, 
this one was only run for five seconds because there were no long pulses or other 
delays. First, the input signals IN3 and EN3 are activated after one second. This 
correctly activates the corresponding output OUT3. Then, after three seconds, the inputs 
EN1 and IN2 are activated which makes the output OUT1 active and OUT3 inactive, as 
required. Based on the simulations, the behaviour of the PL was correct. 
Finally, the complete PLS was simulated. Test cases were devised for the PLS 
based on the requirements specification similarly to the subsystems. Thus, the PLS was 
simulated using the following test cases: 
1. MANUAL activated after 1 second 
2. ALARM_HIGH activated after 1 second 
3. ACCELERATION activated after 1 second 
4. ALARM_MED activated after 1 seconds 
5. ALARM_HIGH activated after 1 second and deactivated after 2 seconds 
6. ALARM_HIGH activated after 1 second, MANUAL activated after 15 seconds 
7. ALARM_HIGH activated after 1 second, ACCELERATION activated after 4 
seconds 
8. ALARM_MED activated after 1 second, ALARM_HIGH activated after 2 
seconds 
9. ALARM_MED activated after 1 second and deactivated after 2 seconds, 
ALARM_MED re-activated after 8 seconds 
10. ALARM_HIGH activated after 1 second and deactivated after 2 seconds, 
ALARM_MED activated after 3 seconds 
Not all of the required features in the requirements specification can be verified using 
these test cases but they cover the key functionalities of the subsystems and the 
prioritisation. The results of test case 6 are illustrated in Fig. 33. 
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Figure 33: Results of the detailed design simulation of the test case 6 of the PLS in 
Simulink 
The I/O signals of the PLS are illustrated in Fig. 33. The simulation was run for thirty 
seconds. In the test case, the input ALARM_HIGH is first activated after one second 
which initiates the functionality of the FSWS. This can be seen in the output PL_OUT2. 
Then, after fifteen seconds the input MANUAL is activated. The MANUAL is of a 
higher priority than the ALARM_HIGH and thus the higher PL_OUT1 is activated and 
the previously active PL_OUT2 is rendered idle. Based on the simulations, the 
behaviour of the PLS was also found correct. 
In the detailed design simulations, the step time was one millisecond that is far 
longer than the actual step time of the device clock. The simulation would have taken 
too long to complete if the system had been simulated using a realistic nanosecond-scale 
step time. Therefore, a one millisecond step time was deemed sufficient due to the 
requirements that stated that there should be a response within one millisecond. 
In detailed design V&V, some model checking was also done. A few requirements 
were tested on the PLS and the PL. The model checking tool was NuSMV (Cavada et 
al., 2010) that has been used in other model checking projects at VTT (Lahtinen et al., 
2012). Models of the systems were created using the NuSMV input language, and the 
requirements were formalised using LTL. 
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The model for the PLS was created based on the logic circuit diagram in Fig. 12. The 
blocks were defined based on their functional descriptions i.e. they had nothing to do 
with the VHDL at this point. In this fully synchronous model, the whole circuit is 
updated at each time point unlike in the more detailed model checking models used in 
the subsequent phases. The model checker concluded that the design meets the specified 
requirements. As an example of LTL, below is one of the checked requirements written 
in natural language and the same requirement formalised in LTL. 
- While Manual is inactive, while high Alarm is inactive, while 
acceleration is inactive, while Medium alarm is active, PS3 
shall follow AS2 Output. 
 
- G(! MANUAL &  ! ALARM_HIGH  & ALARM_MED -> (PL_OUT3 <-> 
SSWS1.PT_OUT)) 
The PL was also checked in the same fashion. A model was built based on the logic 
circuit diagram in Fig. 15 in the NuSMV language. Again, only a couple of 
requirements were checked. As an example, one of the tested requirements is below 
written in both natural language and in LTL. 
- while as2 output and as2 enable and ps3 are active, while MS 
output and MS enable are inactive, when as1 output and as1 
enable are activated, ps3 shall be inactivated and ps2 shall be 
activated 
 
- G(! PL_OUT3  & ! IN3 & ! EN3 & IN1 & EN1 & X(! IN2 & ! EN2 & IN1 
& EN1)  
-> X(PL_OUT3 & ! PL_OUT2)) 
The model checker concluded that the PL also meets the checked requirements. Models 
that are based on logic block diagrams have been checked using model checking before, 
so it was more interesting to try out model checking in the subsequent V&V phases. 
 
Behaviour V&V 
 
In the behaviour V&V, the main activity was the simulation of the VHDL code. A 
software tool called ModelSim by Mentor Graphics was used (Mentor Graphics, 2010). 
In order to do the simulations, an additional VHDL entity needed to be created to 
implement a test bench. A test bench VHDL entity typically has no I/O ports and 
contains instances of other VHDL entities that are tested. Different test cases are 
implemented inside processes where VHDL signals act as the I/O signals for the entity 
instances under test. 
The actual clock cycle could not be used because the simulation would have taken 
too long. Instead, a hundred times slower clock was generated which was an 
improvement compared to the one millisecond cycle of the detailed design simulation. 
The same test cases were used in the behavioural simulation as in the detailed design 
simulation. In the following text, the results of the same test cases as in the detailed 
design simulations are illustrated. 
Unlike in the detailed design simulation, the basic blocks were also simulated 
because they were manually implemented i.e. not ready-made like in Simulink. As an 
example of this, the results of the simulation of the two-input AND-block are in Fig. 34. 
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Figure 34: Results of the behavioural simulation of the basic functionality of the two-
input AND-block in ModelSim 
On the top of Fig. 34, the rapid clock signal (clk) can be seen, and the other I/O signals 
of the AND-block are below. The simulation was done using a generated 500 kHz clock 
and run for three seconds. Even a short simulation like this took over ten seconds to 
complete due to the rapid clock signal. After one second in the simulation, the first input 
is activated which has no effect on the output. Then, after two seconds, the second input 
is also activated, and now the output is activated as well. The block seems to function 
correctly i.e. implements the logical AND functionality. 
After the individual blocks were tested, the subsystems were tested. The SSWS was 
tested first with the same test cases that were used in the detailed design simulation. The 
results of the test case 1 are illustrated in Fig. 35. 
 
Figure 35: Results of the behavioural simulation of the test case 1 of the SSWS in 
ModelSim 
The I/O signals in Fig. 35 behave similarly to the ones in the detailed design simulation 
in Fig. 30. Based on the simulations, the SSWS behaves correctly. A closer examination 
of the results in Fig. 35 reveals that there are delays of a few clock cycles between e.g. 
when the PROCESS_TRIP is activated and when the output is activated. This is 
illustrated in Fig. 36. 
 
Figure 36: The response delay between the signals introduced by the synchronous 
design principle 
The phenomenon in Fig. 36 occurs because the design is synchronous i.e. the blocks 
function only on the rising edges of the clock signal. This means that a signal 
propagates between the blocks only when there is a rising edge on the clock. Therefore, 
as the PROCESS_TRIP propagates through several blocks before affecting the 
OUTPUT, delays of a few clock cycles are introduced between the signals. Luckily 
these few clock cycle “sync delays” are meaningless with regard to the required 
response time of one millisecond. 
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It should be emphasised that these delays have nothing to do with the actual hardware-
related propagation delays in the actual components. Those delays have not yet been 
modelled in this stage. First such delays, although still not completely realistic, are 
introduced in synthesis. 
After the simulations of the SSWS, the FSWS was similarly simulated. The same 
test cases were used as in the detailed design simulation and the results of the simulation 
of the test case 5 are illustrated in Fig. 37. 
 
Figure 37: Results of the behavioural simulation of the test case 5 of the FSWS in 
ModelSim 
In Fig. 37, the I/O signals of the FSWS behave similarly to the corresponding detailed 
design simulation results in Fig. 31. The clock frequency was the same 500 kHz used in 
the SSWS simulations, and the simulation was run for thirty seconds. The six-second 
operation sequence is correct and the additional pulse is correctly initiated when the 
MANUAL_TRIP is activated after ten seconds. Based on the simulations, the FSWS 
behaves correctly. 
The third subsystem, PL, was tested next. The test bench was configured to run the 
test cases successively similarly to the detailed design simulation. It would be wise to 
test each of the test cases also individually because there is no guarantee that the 
internal state of the PL is correct after each test case. In Fig. 38, the results of the 
simulation of the test cases 3 and 1 are illustrated. 
 
Figure 38: Results of the behavioural simulation of the test cases 3 and 1 of the PL in 
ModelSim 
The signals in Fig. 38 look similar to the ones in the detailed design simulation in Fig. 
32. The simulation was run using the 500 kHz clock and for five seconds. Like the 
previous subsystems, the PL also behaved correctly based on the simulation results. 
After the behaviour of the subsystems was deemed correct, it was time to test the 
whole system. The results of the behavioural simulation of the test case 6 of the PLS are 
illustrated in Fig. 39. 
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Figure 39: Results of the behavioural simulation of the test case 6 of the PLS in 
ModelSim 
In Fig. 39, there are more signals than in the detailed design simulation in Fig. 33. This 
is because the I/O ports representing the pins of the cable used in the communication 
between the devices were also modelled. The ports representing the cable pins are the 
ones below the ‘pl3’ and have a ‘_cable’ suffix. The different delays due to the 
synchronous design can be seen in Fig. 40. 
 
Figure 40: Delays introduced to the PLS simulations due to the synchronous design 
principle 
It is interesting to see how the signals propagate in the system. First, ALARM_HIGH is 
activated and, on the same rising edge of the clock, the FSWS_PROCTRIP_CABLE 
that represents the pin where the ALARM_HIGH is conveyed to the FSWS is also 
activated. 
The FSWS_ENABLE_CABLE is activated on the next clock cycle as it only goes 
through the FSWS without any special processing. It takes a while for the FSWS to 
form the output and after six cycles after the first activation of the ALARM_HIGH, the 
FSWS_OUTPUT_CABLE becomes active. Then, the PL processes the signals and after 
nine clock cycles after the initial activation of the ALARM_HIGH, the output PL2 
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finally becomes active. This does not violate the one millisecond response time 
requirement but it is still good to know that such a delay exists. 
A Tcl script that was used in the previous case study (Lötjönen, 2012) was modified 
to enable the use of external input files as test inputs in the PLS as well. This enables 
more comprehensive testing as the test input vectors can be in a more generic form, and 
automatically processed in the test bench. However, this was not utilised in this case 
study because the aim was not to do comprehensive testing, but it could be used in 
future studies. 
The behaviour of the PLS was also correct based on the simulation results. In the 
actual VHDL implementation there were still the higher level entities CYCLONE and 
IGLOO which were not simulated because they are merely used to house the already 
tested lower level entities. They were simulated in synthesis simulation because the 
design in synthesis is already on its way to becoming an actual FPGA application and 
should be realistic. 
Model checking was also done in the behaviour V&V. The models of the same 
systems, the PLS and the PL, were checked as in the detailed design V&V. Also, the 
same requirements were checked as in the previous phase. Now, models of the systems 
were built based on the VHDL source code using the NuSMV input language. The 
VHDL code itself could not be used as the model in this case but in future studies this 
should be explored. 
The models are rather similar to the ones built in the detailed design V&V phase but 
now the blocks operate similarly to the ones in the VHDL description meaning that each 
individual function block in the model takes one time point to update its outputs based 
on the inputs. Similarly to the simulations, a significantly slower time cycle had to be 
used because the checking would have taken too long when using a realistic time cycle. 
A time cycle of one hundred milliseconds was used. 
The model checking concluded also in this stage that the designs meet the checked 
requirements. However, as the models are not necessarily formally equivalent to the 
VHDL models, the results may not be as convincing as if the VHDL models were used 
as such. Nevertheless, the model checking in the behavioural description V&V was 
deemed successful. 
 
Synthesis V&V 
 
In synthesis V&V, initially the main focus was on gate-level simulation. A quick review 
of the gate-level schematic diagrams did not reveal any errors introduced during the 
synthesis procedure. Because the design is very simple and as the design does not 
contain redundant blocks i.e. nothing for the synthesis tool to omit, it was to be 
expected that errors would not be introduced during synthesis. 
As the synthesis design phase results in device-dependent products, the CYCLONE 
and the IGLOO entities could no longer be tested together as they reside on different 
hardware. This means that at least the complete PLS could not be tested through gate-
level simulation. 
Additionally, it turned out that for some reason, the pulse-blocks in the SSWS and 
FSWS did not function during gate-level simulation. As a result, the entire IGLOO 
could not be simulated. However, because the design should have been simulated using 
a realistic clock frequency, simulation would have been impossible either way because a 
slower clock signal would have been necessary in order for the simulations to be 
completed in a sensible time. 
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Simulating the design using a slower clock frequency defeats the purpose of the gate-
level simulation as the purpose is to show that the behaviour of the design that is to be 
transformed into an FPGA application has not changed during synthesis. Therefore, 
after the behaviour of the design would have been deemed correct during the simulation 
using a slower clock, the synthesis should have been performed again using a realistic 
clock in order for the output product to be usable in the next phase in the design 
process. As the synthesis would now be performed again, the simulation results 
acquired previously using the slower clock could not be considered evidence of the 
correctness of the newly synthesised design. 
Unfortunately, problems arose in the gate-level simulation of the CYCLONE as 
well. Although there would not have been problems with the time as the purely 
combinatorial Cyclone without the serial transmission entity could have been simulated 
using a realistic clock, the ModelSim version that was used was provided by Actel and 
could not be used for simulating the CYCLONE gate-level netlist synthesised for the 
Altera FPGA. 
 A version of ModelSim provided by Altera would have been available on their web 
site but not for the version of the Altera Quartus II software tool that was used in the 
design. Therefore, in future studies, the selection of the tools should be made in such a 
way that these issues can be avoided. 
In the formal verification, only model checking could be done in synthesis V&V. 
The tools needed for the LEC were not available and thus it could not be conducted. 
Similarly to the detailed design and behavioural V&V phases, models were built based 
on the gate-level schematic diagrams output by the software tools. This time, however, 
a model of the PLS could not be constructed because the gate-level schematic diagram 
was too complex. 
The complexity is caused by the pulse blocks in the FSWS and the SSWS. In the 
pulse blocks, large integers are needed as counters to manipulate time which means that 
many d-flip-flops are needed to implement the memory elements needed for storing and 
operating with the large integers. Intricate structures such as large timers easily lead to 
state explosion in the reachable space of the model checking model. Consequently, 
property verification on these models becomes infeasible. 
In future studies, either the gate-level schematic should be properly exported or the 
use of the other output product, the EDIF netlist, should be looked into. The difficulties 
that were faced are in line with the previous experience of challenges regarding the 
manipulation of time when using FPGAs (Lötjönen, 2012). It makes simulation and 
apparently also model checking difficult when there is a need to spend time in the 
second scale. 
The PL was checked successfully as it does not contain anything else than 
combinatorial logic blocks. The gate-level schematic is fairly similar to the logic circuit 
diagram; the synchronous blocks in the model are implemented so that the 
combinatorial part is performed instantaneously, and the result is assigned to a d-flip-
flop whose output is updated after one clock cycle. 
Although the synthesised gate-level schematic is logically equivalent to the 
descriptions in the previous phases, the synthesis tool removed one of the input ports of 
the PL. The removed port was the IN1 input. Although this seems alarming, when the 
logic circuit diagrams are inspected, it can be seen that the IN1 is after all redundant 
because both the IN1 and EN1 originate from the same signal MANUAL i.e. their 
values are always the same. If they could differ, the synthesis tool would most likely 
have left both ports intact. 
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The logical equivalence between the model of the PL based on the VHDL code and the 
model based on the gate-level schematic was verified by using the model checker. If 
only the PL entity was synthesised as a separate project, both ports would be preserved 
because there is no knowledge of where the signals originate from and could very well 
have different values. 
 
Place and route V&V 
 
As part of the place and route V&V, a review of the physical layout models of the 
CYCLONE and IGLOO was done which did not reveal any errors as there were no 
special requirements for the configuration and placement and of individual CLBs. 
Therefore, the only thing that needed to be verified was that the behaviour of the 
designs had not changed as a result of the PAR. 
The software tools apparently performed some sort of static timing analysis during 
the PAR and some reports were provided containing information about the overall 
propagation delays etc. Without any deeper analysis, the overall propagation delays 
seem to be in the range of tens of nanoseconds which is good because the required 
response time was one millisecond. More emphasis on the timing analyses should be 
put in future studies especially if the systems then are more critical with respect to the 
timings. 
The equivalence of the technology-level models with the gate-level schematics was 
of interest. As expected, the technology-level simulation was unsuccessful because the 
version of ModelSim that was used could not be used for the CYCLONE physical 
layout design mapped for the Altera FPGA. 
The formal verification for the technology-level netlist or the physical layout model 
could not be conducted. Again, the lack of tools prohibited LEC, and the physical layout 
model could not be exported in such a way that would have enabled the creation of an 
SMV model for the model checking. The utilisation of the netlist and the use of the 
physical layout model in model checking should be looked into in future studies. 
 
Configuration V&V 
 
As the designs inside the two FPGAs were strongly dependent on each other, the FPGA 
testing that is supposed to be part of configuration V&V was done as part of integration 
V&V. In other words, hardware tests using the previously presented test cases were 
performed only after both FPGAs had been configured and connected together using the 
parallel cable. 
The other part of configuration V&V, the verification of the configuration was not 
extensive because there were limitations in the read-back capabilities of the FPGAs. 
The configuration of the IGLOO could not be read back altogether (Microsemi, 2012b), 
and from the Cyclone, only the configuration of the non-volatile configuration memory 
could be read back. The actual configuration of the FPGA could not be read back. 
The configuration was read back from the non-volatile configuration memory of the 
Cyclone development kit. The length of the file was 524,472 bytes and it had an eight-
byte checksum. The file originally used for the configuration was one byte longer but 
had the same checksum. To inspect the bit streams, the configuration files were first 
converted into raw programming data (.rpd) files using the Quartus II, and then 
compared to each other to find differences using a tool called vBinDiff (Madsen, 2008). 
No differences between the files were found. 
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Integration V&V 
 
In integration V&V, the functionality of the overall system was tested. The input signals 
were given using the switches and the buttons on the Cyclone development kit 
highlighted in Fig. 9. The outputs could be observed both by using the seven-segment 
displays on the Cyclone development kit and by using Matlab to process the serial data 
transmitted by the Cyclone development kit. 
The same test cases were used as in the simulations although only the ones 
concerning the whole system could be tested because the subsystems were now 
packaged inside the CYCLONE and IGLOO entities. Some of the functionalities of the 
test cases of the individual subsystems could be tested on the entire system by only 
manipulating the inputs that initiate the particular subsystems. The functionality of the 
test case 1 of the SSWS was first tested, and the results are illustrated in Fig. 41. 
 
Figure 41: Results of the hardware tests of the functionality of test case 1 of the SSWS 
in Matlab 
The results in Fig. 41 look rather similar to those in the detailed design simulation of the 
SSWS in Fig. 30 although the signals are now the I/O signals of the PLS. The transients 
are not as straight vertically as in the previous tests, which makes them look almost like 
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analogue signals. However, this is only an illusion caused by the low one hundred-
millisecond resolution of the serial transmission. 
Although the requirements specification required a one millisecond response time, 
it could not be tested because of the slow processing of the serial data in Matlab. The 
cycle time of one hundred milliseconds was used i.e. the serial transmitter in the 
Cyclone development kit was configured to transmit ten bytes in a second. A ten 
millisecond cycle was tried first but the serial data became distorted for an unknown 
reason. In future studies, better serial communication interface should be developed. 
As the inputs were given manually by using the switches and buttons, the timings 
were not precise, so the results of the FPGA testing are merely indicative. In future 
studies, the serial transceiver could be made to not only transmit the signals but also to 
receive inputs generated e.g. by a PC. The signal values were also exported into a file 
that can be inspected e.g. using Microsoft Excel. A part of the output file of the first test 
case is in Table 2. 
Table 2: Part of the output file of a hardware test of the functionality of the test case 1 
of the SSWS 
 MANUAL ALARM_HIGH ALARM_MED ACCELERATION PL_OUT1 PL_OUT2 PL_OUT3 CHECKBIT 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
12 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
13 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
14 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
15 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
16 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
 
In Table 2, the time runs on the leftmost column. The resolution is one hundred 
milliseconds so e.g. the numeral value ‘10’ means 1000 ms i.e. one second. The rest of 
the columns represent the value of the signal indicated by the first row of the columns. 
In the first test case, the ALARM_MED was activated after one second. In Table 2, this 
is indicated by the value of ALARM_MED changing from ‘1’ to ‘0’ at time ‘12’ i.e. 
after 1.2 seconds.  
The deviance from the 1.0 seconds is explained by both the inaccuracy of the 
manual input and the low resolution serial transmission. At the same time however, the 
PL_OUT3 is correctly activated. The exported files were not exploited any further but 
in future studies they could be used to do more detailed analysis of the hardware tests. 
However, this would require a significantly higher resolution and a way to use the serial 
port to also send inputs to the FPGA. 
The rest of the testing concentrated on the PLS test cases. Based on the meagre 
hardware tests, the complete integrated system seemed to behave correctly. To make 
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sure that the system could function even a little longer, the system was left performing 
the FSWS functionality for a weekend. On the following Monday, the system was still 
functioning correctly. As a curiosity, it was reported that there was also a power outage 
during the weekend. 
An interesting question related to this is that if an FPGA-based passive safety 
system was used in an NPP, and the FPGA was SRAM-based, how could the 
correctness of the re-configuration that follows a power outage be verified? In the case 
study, the system simply restarts and the functionality can be inspected but a passive 
safety system would not reveal the error as the system is only used on-demand. A read-
back of the actual configuration in the FPGA is required to verify its correctness. 
Despite operating mostly correctly, some anomalies were detected in the operation 
of the integrated system. When the FPGAs are powered up, the seven-segment displays 
sometimes show that one of the outputs is active (PL_OUT2 most frequently. This is 
probably caused by some of the d-flip-flops being in an arbitrary state after power-up. 
An asynchronous reset should have been designed into the system to avoid this. The 
reset would be enabled during power-up and then disabled after a specified time to start 
up the functionality correctly. 
Additionally, when the interconnecting cable is disconnected from either end during 
operation, the active-low principle used in the signals should cause the highest priority 
output (the FSWS output) conveyed via the cable to become active. This does not 
happen however. Furthermore, sometimes when the cable is connected back during 
operation, the PL_OUT2 initiated normally by the FSWS becomes active for two 
seconds. The connecting of the cable must cause a voltage spike that is interpreted as an 
activation of the signals in the cable. 
4.5 Summary of the case study 
The PLS case study was partly successful and partly unsuccessful. The design process 
described in Section 2.3 was successfully followed through starting from the 
requirements and ending up with an apparently correctly functioning FPGA system. 
Unfortunately, some of the V&V methods described in Section 2.4 could not be tested 
due to lack of knowledge, experience, and the appropriate software tools. An illustration 
of what V&V activities were performed and what were not is in Table 3. The table is 
the same as Table 1 except that now the activities are coloured according to whether 
they were performed or not. 
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Table 3: Activities performed (green) and not performed (red) in the different phases of 
the V&V process of the PLS case study 
 Review Formal 
Verification 
Testing 
Requirements V&V Requirements 
review,  
Formalised 
requirements 
review 
  
Architecture V&V Architecture 
review 
 Simulation 
Detailed Design 
V&V 
Logic circuit 
review,  
Hardware 
specification 
review 
Model checking Logic Circuit 
Simulation 
Behaviour V&V HDL code review Model checking RTL simulation, 
static analyses 
Synthesis V&V EDIF netlist 
review,  
schematic 
diagram review 
Model checking, 
logic 
equivalence 
checking 
Gate-level 
simulation 
Place and Route 
V&V 
Physical layout 
model review 
Model checking, 
logic 
equivalence 
checking 
Technology-level 
simulation, 
static timing 
analysis 
Configuration 
V&V 
 
 
 FPGA testing, 
verification of 
the 
configuration 
Integration V&V   Operational 
tests, circuit 
board tests 
The activities coloured green in Table 3 are the ones that were performed. One of the 
objectives, to get to FPGAs communicating with each other, was successfully 
completed. Also, the serial connection was established successfully. The testing of the 
V&V methods that could not be tested in this case study can be carried out in future 
studies. 
The PLS case study provided verification for the impression that special knowledge 
about both software and hardware design is indeed required in FPGA design. Many of 
the challenges rose mainly from the lack of knowledge of the hardware-related details 
of the FPGA technology. With more knowledge and proper tools, many aspects of the 
design and V&V processes and the system itself can be improved and made more 
realistic. This offers a good basis for future studies. 
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5 Discussion 
The design and V&V processes described in Chapter 2 were combined from different 
sources and presented in such a way that they should be understandable even to non-
experts. This type of a wide collection of methods is rarely seen in other literature so the 
descriptions of the processes may prove useful to the reader when compiling an overall 
impression of what types of activities are typically included in the FPGA design and 
V&V processes. 
There may be additional design and V&V activities to those described in Chapter 2. 
The activities related to different design and V&V methods described in the chapter are 
the ones most often found in the literature. A more comprehensive study of the methods 
and whether there still are some relevant activities omitted from this work should be 
conducted. However, the design and V&V processes illustrated in Chapter 2 should 
provide a good overview of their nature and using e.g. the V&V process should provide 
a good amount of evidence of the correctness of given applications. 
The formal verification methods, especially model checking, are widely used in the 
IC industry for hardware verification. Model checking is also used in the verification of 
software-based systems but, as especially the later stages of the FPGA design process 
yield products similar to the ones in IC design, model checking may prove more 
applicable for verifying the products than currently perceived. This is a good subject for 
future studies. 
As there is a need for internationally consistent guidance regarding the design and 
V&V of FPGA-based applications in NPP safety automation, the topics of Chapter 2 
could be looked into more deeply and based on that, an NPP-related guide for FPGA 
design and V&V could be put together. The guide could incorporate Finnish regulations 
regarding digital I&C technology in NPPs and reflect on how, using the different design 
and V&V methods, those regulations could be satisfied using FPGA-based systems. As 
there are new NPP projects and modernisations starting and on-going in Finland, there 
seems to be demand for a guide regarding how the Finnish regulations in particular 
could be met by using FPGA as the implementation technology for the safety 
automation.  
Also included in the guide could be an elaboration of the capabilities, advantages, 
and disadvantages of using FPGAs instead of software-based systems. The suitability 
and the advantages and disadvantages were explored in Chapter 3 of this document. 
However, many of the claims introduced in the chapter should be tested in order to 
validate them. For example, tests could be made where the performance of an 
application implemented in both software and FPGA is compared. 
Especially the challenges faced during the V&V process of the system in the case 
study justified the impression that the FPGA design and V&V processes are more 
complex than the software processes. Knowledge of the hardware-related details is 
indeed required especially in the later phases of the design and V&V processes. This 
has been widely seen as one of the disadvantages of the FPGA technology because the 
experts in both NPP safety automation and FPGA are scarcer than their software 
counterparts. 
As reported at the end of Chapter 4, many of the V&V methods such as gate- and 
technology-level simulation and LEC described in Chapter 2 could not be tested in the 
case study. Also, the VHDL design was done completely by manually writing the 
source code. In actual projects, reportedly the code is many times generated from a 
higher-level description, so it would be appropriate to employ this in future studies and 
see what kinds of new V&V requirements and challenges arise. 
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The problems regarding the spending of time seem to have not been reported in the 
literature previously. Therefore, it can be seen as an important result of this work that 
when systems are needed to deal with seconds or even longer periods of time, there are 
significant challenges in the V&V of those designs when using FPGAs. Many actual 
NPP safety functions deal with long periods of time, so some kind of solution to the 
time-problem should be found. 
Regarding the V&V, for future studies proper tools that enable all the activities 
described in Chapter 2 and more knowledge of the specifics related to the activities 
need be acquired. Also in future studies, designs should be comprehensively tested 
using the methods in order to get a real impression of whether the methods yield 
credible evidence of the correctness of the design. To make the design process more 
realistic, also diverse design and V&V teams should be used.  
In hardware testing, the test inputs should be fed into the FPGA by some other 
method than the imprecise manual use of switches and buttons on the development kits 
practised in the case study. The serial connection provides a way to feed arbitrary input 
vectors generated by a PC to the FPGA. Also, the exportation of the test results into 
files in a generic format enables e.g. statistical testing and analysis of the results. 
The serial connection could also be used to connect the FPGA to a simulator 
running a model of an NPP. Then, different functions representing different subsystems 
of the NPP could be implemented and tested on the FPGA. Additionally, a software-
based system running on a simple microcontroller performing the same function as the 
FPGA could be connected in parallel. The system would then mimic a realistic system 
where the FPGA is used as diverse backup for the primary software-based system. 
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6 Conclusions 
As a result of this work, good models of the design and V&V processes were obtained 
by combining models found in several sources in literature. Although the design process 
seems to be sufficient, the V&V process will probably be expanded in the future as 
more V&V activities are identified. However, by using the methods that were identified 
in this work, a good amount of evidence of the correctness of an application can be 
acquired. 
The increasing amount of operational FPGA-based systems in NPPs around the 
world indicates that the FPGA technology is suitable for use in the systems also in 
practice as well as in theory. However, the complexity of the design process and the 
need to have knowledge of the hardware-related specifics are real disadvantages 
although the actual application is less complex than the software counterpart. 
The design of the case study system was successful as the system turned out just the 
way originally intended. The communication between the two different FPGA devices 
was implemented successfully and the system fulfils the requirements devised for the 
system. The explicit description of the whole design process that was followed through 
in the case study is useful to anyone who is interested in FPGA design. As the design 
consists of many phases, the practice of using the same design blocks as the examples in 
illustrating different phases helps the reader to understand what happens in the phases 
and what the differences between them are. 
Although the design process itself was successful, several of the V&V activities in 
Table 1 could not be conducted due to the lack of proper tools and knowledge, and the 
problems with the time. An important result of the case study was the notion that when 
there is a need to deal with time in the second-scale such as in the pulse blocks in the 
case study, many problems arise in the V&V of such designs. As the clock frequencies 
of FPGAs are typically in the nanosecond-scale, implementing timers in the second-
scale requires implementation of special integer counters. In FPGAs, there are no 
dedicated timer devices such as those found in many microcontrollers. 
The fast clocks caused problems in the simulations and model checking. While the 
behavioural description simulations could be done using a slower clock, the gate- and 
technology-level simulations were not meaningful to do with a slower clock because at 
those phases the design should be such that it can be transformed into hardware. The 
purpose of these simulations was to verify that there were no errors introduced during 
the automated synthesis and PAR procedures and thus the design should be realistic i.e. 
such that reflects the intended final product.  
As an additional result of the case study, many subjects for future studies emerged 
which can also be seen as one of the objectives of case studies in general. If the FPGA 
technology continues to gain ground in the nuclear power industry, there will be an 
increasing demand for new FPGA-related studies for which subjects can be looked for 
in this thesis. 
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